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SMITHFIELD FOODS: A CASE FOR FEDERAL AcTION
LEER. OKSTER"
I. INTRODUCTION

The fact that the United States has prevailed thus far as a matter of
law in the Smithfield Foods case does not answer the larger policy
questions that have arisen in this matter. Judge Smith's opinion provides a
clear and compelling vindication of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) legal authority to act in this case, ' and if the EPA's legal
* Environmental Protection Specialist, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, Water Enforcement Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. M.S.,
1985; B.S., 1982, University of Michigan. The views expressed in this Article are the
author's own and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the Environmental
Protection Agency or the Department of Justice. I am indebted to the following people
for their comments on previous drafts: Claudia O'Brien, David Drelich, Don Olson, Joe
Theis, Nadine Steinberg, Sarah Himmelhoch, Richard Hong, Mike Goodstein, Lori
Reynolds, Yvette Roundtree and Leonard Nash. Any errors or omissions are the
author's.
'See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997). The
judge's opinion is a comprehensive analysis of the liability issues in the case. First, the
court granted partial summary judgment for the United States for the violations of
Smithfield's National Pollutant Discharge System (NPDES) permit, including late
reporting, document destruction, false reporting and the effluent limits for phosphorus,
ammonia-nitrogen, total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), fecal coliform, minimum pH, cyanide,
oil and grease, carbonaceous biochemical oxygen demand (CBOD), biochemical oxygen
demand (BOD), and total suspended solids (TSS). In assigning liability for the permit
effluent limit violations, the court stated that the Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs)
submitted by Smithfield could be accepted as true and, thus, could be used as admissions
to establish liability. Second, the court found that Smithfield's permit did not
incorporate, nor was it conditioned, revised, or superseded by the Consent Special Orders
issued to the company by the Virginia State Water Control Board (the Board). See
discussion, infra notes 301-409. In making this ruling, the court rejected Smithfield's
contention that it should have been able to rely on the statements of the Board without
fear of being subjected to a federal enforcement action. Third, the court rejected the
company's claim that the United States' action was barred by estoppel and/or laches,
finding that the United States had not engaged in any affirmative misconduct as required
to prevail in an estoppel claim. Fourth, the court ruled that the United States' claims
were not barred by the provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA or "the Act") which bars
federal civil penalty action in situations where "a State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this subsection." CWA §
309(g)(6)(A)(ii), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)(1994). The court held that Virginia's law
was not "comparable" to CWA § 309(g)(6) because the State did not have unilateral
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authority were the only issue to consider, then the judge's opinion would
have satisfied all questions. The judge's legal opinion, however, does not
address the central policy question of this case: why did the EPA take the
extraordinary measure of intervening between an approved sovereign and
a violating facility when that sovereign was pursuing its own
administrative remedy?2 The answer to this question is even more
pressing given that the United States did not seek environmental clean up
with its action since its claims for injunctive relief were satisfied before
trial; i.e., the company ceased discharging to the Pagan River.3 The
corollary policy question is why couldn't Smithfield simply have relied on
the State's administrative orders to determine their appropriate course of
action? If only state law were involved, the answer to this latter question
authority to impose administrative penalties, and the State enforcement process, at the
time of the issuance of the Consent Special Orders, failed to provide adequate procedures
for public participation. Finally, the court rejected Smithfield's claim that the United
States' action was barred by § 510 of the Act, which provides, in relevant part "nothing
in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State... to adopt or enforce (A)
any standard or limitation ... or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of
pollution" that is equally or more stringent than those prescribed by federal law. See also
United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1997) (outlining the
rationale used by the judge to set the penalty amount ($12.6 million) in this case).
2 This situation is commonly referred to as "overfiling." See Relationship Between the
Federal and State Governments in the Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 1997:
HearingBefore the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 105th Cong. 202, at
161-62 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 HearingBefore the Committee on Environmental and
Public Works] (statement of Steven A. Herman) [hereinafter Herman Statement].
Federal overfiling is the initiation of a federal enforcement action,
either administrative or civil, following a State enforcement action ....
Statistics show that overfiling is in fact a rare event. As reported by a
state-by-state survey conducted by ECOS, the agency overfiled on
about 30 cases or 0.3 percent of all Federal enforcement action during
fiscal years 1992 through 1994. During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the
agency overfiled on a total of 18 cases or about 0.1 percent of State
enforcement cases. From October 1995 through September 1996, there
was a total of four overfiling cases.
Id.
3 Smithfield Foods operated two separate wastewater treatment facilities, Gwaltney and
Smithfield Packing, which discharged into the Pagan River. The company connected its
Gwaltney plant to the Hampton Roads Sanitation District (HRSD) wastewater treatment
plant in June 1996. This hook up occurred prior to the United States filing its action in
this case. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 773 (E.D. Va.
1997). The Smithfield Packing plant of Smithfield Foods connected its treatment facility
to the HRSD on August 4, 1997. See Brief for Appellants at 13, United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 97-2709).
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would be simple-they could have. However, the federal nature of the
Clean Water Act (CWA)4 alters the complexion of the analysis. This
article addresses these policy questions and provides a rationale for why
the public interest was served by the federal government's intervention in
this case.
The EPA did not take this action simply because it had a right to
do so. There are risks in any action before a court, and the risk of an
adverse legal opinion forces the EPA to be careful when it exposes its
programs to the interpretation of the judiciary.' Moreover, if the EPA had
acted only for the sake of flexing its legal muscles then it would have
damaged the credibility of the regulatory programs that it administers and
enforces. Nor did the EPA take this action simply to protect sensitive
environmental resources or values.6 Enforcement is often seen as a means
to achieve environmental restoration, but it is not designed, and should not
be used, as the primary means to achieve the environmental objectives
outlined in the CWA.7 That purpose is rightfully served by control
mechanisms such as permits, issued to facilities subject to CWA
jurisdiction. Even though the United States' claims for injunctive relief
were satisfied before trial, the case still served a variety of public policy
functions that could not be furthered by any means other than
enforcement.
The evidence at trial proved that Smithfield violated the CWA for
a period of several years.' Because Smithfield was not required by the
Commonwealth of Virginia to comply with the water quality-based
effluent limitations for phosphorus in its permit (as well as other permit
conditions), it was not required to install appropriate treatment for the
pollutants in its discharges in a timely fashion.9 As a result, Smithfield
was allowed to discharge insufficiently treated wastewater from its
4 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).

s Conversely, however, it is also true that courts are reticent to impose their wills on
Executive Branch programs. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause: A PoliticalTheory ofAmerican Federalism,47 VAND. L. REv. 1355,
1362 (1994) ("Federal courts are politically vulnerable institutions that have powerful
reasons to be cautious in imposing restrictions on the other branches of the national
government.").
6 However, there was an important environmental component to its rationale in pursuing
this action, even though its request for environmental injunctive relief was satisfied
before the trial in this case. See discussion infra notes 460-480.
7
See discussion infra notes 93-172.
8
See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp 769, 781-84 (E.D. Va. 1997).
9 See id. at 772-81.
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industrial operations, and by doing so, it was able to avoid or delay the
cost of treatment for the entire time that it was in violation. By evading
compliance with the law, therefore, Smithfield contributed to the
significant degradation of the Pagan River and, potentially, the
Chesapeake Bay." The company also gained a substantial financial
benefit from its illegal discharges. 2
The State's administrative action in this case was inappropriate
simply because it allowed Smithfield to continue discharging inadequately
treated wastes in violation of federal law for a period of several years, and
it did not impose any penalty on Smithfield to offset the competitive
advantage enjoyed by the company as a result of their noncompliance. 3
The EPA took its action to ensure that an economically powerful and
politically influential company 4 could not evade compliance with federal
1o See id.
" The Pagan River flows into the James River, which is a tributary to the Chesapeake
Bay.
" See discussion infra notes 482-524. But see Robert H. Fuhrman & Patrick D. Traylor,
Explainingthe ControversySurroundingUnited States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 23 WM.
& MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 479 (1999) (arguing that the court improperly
calculated the amount of the civil penalty against Smithfield).
3 See discussion infra notes 482-524. But see generally Fuhrman & Traylor, supra note

12.

14 See generally Robert Little, Luter Insists He Didn't Seek Special Favors From
Allen,
He Says He Gave PAC $100,000 Because He Liked Governor's Views, THE VIRGINIAN-

PILOT, Oct. 28, 1995, at Al, availablein 1995 WL 8991471
Smithfield Foods Inc. Chairman Joseph W. Luter Il decided to give
$100,000 to Gov. George F. Allen's Republican campaign committee
after a private dinner with Allen last winter at the Governor's mansion.
... The two talked about Virginia politics and the difficulties that the
state's environmental regulations have posed over the years for
businesses like Smithfield Foods, Luter said Friday.
Id. See also SurpriseInspection at Smithfield Foods, This is New, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Dec. 21, 1996, at A18, available in 1996 WL 10873553 ("the Allen administration's
handling of Smithfield Foods' environmental violations might best have been described
as gentle or friendly"); Scott Harper, Court Orders Smithfield Foods to Control Wastes,
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 14, 1996, atB1, availablein 1996 WL 10872835
The report by the Joint Legislative and Audit Review Commission, or

JLARC, pointed out allegations that DEQ administrators had blocked a
request to fine Smithfield Foods $278,000 last year for past pollution
violations. At the time, Smithfield Foods was Allen's biggest political

contributor, giving the governor's political action committee $125,000
during negotiations over the penalties for those past violations.
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law and thereby gain an inequitable competitive advantage. 5 In addition,
this federal action was necessary to prevent the state from modifying or
superseding federal permit requirements using a state administrative action
without appropriate public participation. 6 For these reasons (among
others, explored in detail below), the EPA initiated its action against
Smithfield, even though the Commonwealth of Virginia was already
pursuing their own administrative remedy in this case.
This article examines the nature of the relationship between the
principal parties of this enforcement triangle: the federal government,
represented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Commonwealth of Virginia, represented
by its State Water Control Board (SWCB or the Board) and its Department
of Environmental Quality (DEQ), and Smithfield Foods (Smithfield).
Further, it will document and evaluate the positions taken by the
respective sovereigns as they proceeded with their independent
enforcement actions in this case, and, ultimately, it will provide a rationale
for why the EPA chose to intervene in this matter.
Part II of the article examines the CWA's statutory mandate for
achieving water quality improvement and pollution control and outlines
the Act's directives relating to the federal/state partnership in
administering the Act's permit program. This Part also discusses two
competing theories of environmental enforcement and explains how these
competing philosophies are at the center of the conflict often experienced
between the federal government and the various states approved to
administer the federal program. In addition, this Part analyzes the EPA's
policy for taking direct enforcement action in approved states. Part III
provides a detailed chronology of events in this complex enforcement
action. It explains the actions taken by the Commonwealth of Virginia
and Smithfield in the period prior to the EPA becoming involved in the
"5This statement should not be understood to mean that the EPA takes into account the
economic status or political influence of a company per se when determining the
appropriate course of action against a violating facility. The EPA does not consider the
financial or political status of a company when evaluating a company's violations or
deciding to initiate a case. Smithfield's economic importance had no intrinsic impact on
the EPA's decision to initiate civil judicial proceedings against the company, nor was the
existence of political contributions a factor in the EPA's decision to enforce. However, a
premise of this article is that Smithfield's economic and political influence was of
paramount importance to the state when they determined their course of action. The
EPA considered the state action to be inadequate given the nature of the case, thus
creating the conflict that ensued with the dual actions.
16 See CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(e).
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case and it provides an account of the interactions between Virginia and
the EPA as the action proceeded to its ultimate conclusion. Part IV
explains why it was important for the federal government to intervene in
the state's administrative enforcement action against Smithfield.
Finally, the article analyzes the general state of our current
cooperative federalist structure in environmental regulation using the
specific details of the Smithfield case as a guide. The essential conclusion
reached is that the Smithfield case vindicates the reciprocal nature of
federalism's protections to individual liberty and social welfare. The
several states exist to countervail the tendency to accumulate political
power within the central government, and thus, to prevent tyranny; and the
federal government is designed, at least in part, to prevent the capture of
states by factions.17 The Smithfield case demonstrates federalism at its
best by documenting the need for the federal government to check the
tendency of the states to accommodate economic interests at the expense
of national public policy goals designed to produce or preserve
environmental goods (as opposed to "economic goods;" i.e., items that are
"properly valued as commodities and properly produced and exchanged in
18
accordance with market norms").
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE FEDERAL/STATE RELATIONSHIP

A. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
PermitProgram
The NPDES permit program is the centerpiece of the CWA's water
pollution control effort.19 It is the principal mechanism through which the
environmental goals of the nation, as defined by the CWA, are achieved. 0
The foremost environmental objective of the Act is to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
'
waters."21
To achieve this overarching objective, the Act enumerates a
series of specific goals and policies, the most conspicuous of which is "the
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
,7 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991); James Huffinan, Governing
America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863, 881 (1992).
Is ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 143 (1993).

'9See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994).
2 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 695 (1974).
21 CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
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eliminated." '2 A more immediate goal of the Act is "the national goal that
wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for
the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides
for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983. "23 These
goals and objectives are national in scope and form the foundation of the
Act's implementation strategy.2 4 As such, they provide the fundamental
underpinnings of the national effort to control water pollution. Each
NPDES permit is designed to implement the national environmental goals
outlined in Section 101(a) of the Act,25 since each permit is designed to
work toward the goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters or, in the interim, achieving the goal of
fishable/swimmable waters.26
One of the fundamental premises of the Act is the illegality of a
' in the absence or in violation of a
discharge from a "point source"27
CWA § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). It is important to keep in mind the
importance placed on the elimination of pollution by the Congress during its debates in
1972, the year the CWA was passed. Senator Muskie, in particular, summed up the
seriousness of the challenge in the following remarks:
[I]n the face of facts which could not be more stark, in the face of a
threat to life that could not be more real, in the face of cries from our
cities and States that could not be more desperate-in the face of all
these things, there are still those in high places who question whether
we can afford to spend this money. Can we afford clean water? Can
we afford rivers and lakes and streams and oceans which continue to
make possible life on this planet? Can we afford life itself?
118 CONG. REC. 33,693 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 164 (1973) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. With respect to the goals outlined iii the body of the paper,
Senator Muskie further opined: "these are not merely the pious declarations that
Congress so often makes in passing its laws; on the contrary, this is literally a life or
death proposition for the Nation." Id. The fact that we have come so far in our efforts to
reduce pollution often diminishes our appreciation of the problems which we have
overcome and the challenges that remain.
23 CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
24
See id.
' See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 695 (1974) (The
Act "relies primarily on a permit program for the achievement of effluent limitations...
to
attain its goals.").
26
See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, U.S. EPA NPDES PERMIT WRITERS MANUAL,
EPA-833-B-96-003, at 4 (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter NPDES PERMIT WRITERS MANUAL];
CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
27 CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) ("'point source' means 'any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal

22
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permit.2" This basic premise provides the other essential function of the
NPDES permit: it is the vehicle that translates the environmental goals of
the Act into specific requirements on individual dischargers. Therefore,
the permit is the primary enforcement mechanism in the Act.29 The
discharge of pollutants is a privilege, not a property right,3" and the permit
program is the only means by which industry and sewage treatment plants
can be authorized to discharge pollutants 3' into navigable waters.32

Without such authorization, any discharge of pollutants from a facility is
illegal.33 The permit, beyond providing the legal mechanism for
authorizing the discharge of pollutants, makes such a discharger
accountable to the public for its actions, since the nature of the facility's
discharge and any violations of the requirements of the permit are publicly
available. 4 This information can be used by private citizens to enforce the
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged"').
28See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
29 See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (1977)
("The NPDES permit program established by § 402 is central to the enforcement of the
FWPCA."). See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054
(1992) ("The primary means for enforcing these limitations and standards is the NPDES
[permit program].").
'oSee generally CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (making discharge of pollutants
presumitvely illegal, except when in compliance with the Act). See also David R. Hodas,
Enforcement ofEnvironmentalLaw in a TriangularFederalSystem: Can Three Not be a
Crowd when Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their
Citizens? 54 MD. L. REv., 1555, at 1565-66 (1995).
Underlying the CWA approach was the adoption of the principle that
no one has the right to pollute the nation's waters. This principle or
ethic translated into the congressional mandate that any person who
discharges without a NPDES permit, or in violation of an existing
NPDES permit, is strictly liable under the CWA. This mandate places
the burden of pollution control on the individual polluter, who must
internalize the cost of pollution reduction.
Hodas, supra,at 1565-66.
3"See generally CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining the term "discharge of
pollutants" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source"
or "to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a
vessel or other floating craft").
32 See generally CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining the term "navigable
waters" as the "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas"). See also §
CWA 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (making discharge of pollutants presumptively illegal
except when in compliance with the Act).
33
See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
34
See CWA § 308,33 U.S.C. § 1318.
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provisions of the permit.35
The NPDES permit, therefore, is also central to Congress' stated
policy for public participation in implementing the Act. 36 The CWA
' and the permit is an important means
"represents a pact with the public"37
by which the public can participate in the process of pollution control,
since it can be issued only after an extensive public notification and
comment process.3" As such, it is the "face" which is shown to the public
in the government's attempt to address the pollution problems facing the
nation's waters. The permit cannot be amended, modified or altered
without the input of the public, 39 unless such an alteration meets the
criteria of a "minor" permit modification, e.g., to correct typographical
errors that do not affect the substantive content of the permit. ' Nor can
the permit be "modified" in private simply by the administering agency
refusing to enforce its conditions.4 ' The regulations concerning the
modification of NPDES permits "ensure that the standards embodied in an
NPDES permit cannot be evaded with the cooperation of compliant state
regulatory authorities." ' 2 This concern was central to the federal
government's motive in addressing the permit violations in the Smithfield
case.

The NPDES permit program has been described as "breathtakingly
ambitious" 3 and rightly so. The CWA regulates approximately 100,000
separate sources of pollution through the NPDES permit program. The
35

See CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. See also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998), available in 1998 U.S. Lexis 1601 (1998) (discussing the

potential limitations to standing faced by citizen plaintiffs in such an action).

See CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) ("Public participation in the development,
revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or
program established by the Administrator or any State under this chapter shall be
provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States.").
37Hodas, supra note 30, at
1577.
31See 40 C.F.R. § 124.10 (1997).
39See
40 C.F.R. §§ 122.62, 124.5(c), 123.25.
40
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.63.
4,See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1577 ("The CWA's pact with the public is that the
government may only issue a permit via a public process, and the Act may not be de
facto amended by the secret, nonpublic means of simply not enforcing it."). See also
Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a state order could not modify a NPDES permit because it did not
36

comply
with the regulations governing modifications of NPDES permits).
42

Id.

43 Robert

V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1161 (1995).
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permit, in each instance, specifies all of the conditions with which the
permittee must comply in order to discharge, including monitoring, record
The
keeping and reporting requirements, and effluent limitations.'
effluent limitations are either technology-based or set based on water
quality goals defined by the States.4" The technology-based limits are
established either from the national effluent limitations guidelines (set by
the EPA on an industry-by-industry basis)46 or by the permit writer using
Best Professional Judgment (BPJ).47 Permit writers, however, are required
to evaluate the impact of every proposed discharge on the water quality
goals of the water body.4" These water quality goals are defined by each
State in the form of water quality standards.49 If technology-based limits
are not sufficient to meet the water quality standards, then permittees must
be required to comply with limits derived from the more stringent water
quality standards established by the State. ° Therefore, any applicable
water quality-based limits take precedence over the generally less stringent
technology-based control, which are set without considering the quality of
the receiving water.
In the past twenty-five years, the successes achieved as a result of
the NPDES program have been impressive. Many people today can
remember a time when Lake Erie was pronounced "dead" and the
Androscoggin River in Maine was labeled as "too thick to paddle and too
thin to plow."5 The Connecticut River was derisively described as "the
best-landscaped sewer in the country" 2 and the salmon perished in the
Willamette River in Oregon.53 Perhaps the clearest example of progress,
however, is that rivers like the Cuyahoga in Ohio no longer catch on fire.54
These waters are well on their way to recovery at present, with many
other waters being described as thriving centers of healthy communities.55
See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1340 (1994).
See id. § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b).
4 See id.
47 See CWA § 402(a)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 125.3 (1997). See
also NPDES PERMIT WRITERS MANUAL, supranote 26, at 69.
41 See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
49 See id. § 303,33 U.S.C. 1313.
'0See id. § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(1)(C).
44
4-

5' U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND
PROTECTING AMERICA'S WATERS
2

I1d. at2.
See id.
4 See id. at i.
SSSee id.
53

1-2 (1998).
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The principal
reason for this success is the CWA and its NPDES permit
56

program

B. CooperativeFederalism-The CWA Construction
The CWA is a modem federal law. As such, it creates a delicate
but essential balance between the need to define national water quality
objectives and goals and the desire to have a decentralized implementation
apparatus. The Act strives for consistency in its overarching principles,
yet appears to undermine that very consistency by allowing entities as
disparate as California and Virginia the opportunity to interpret its
mandates. Even though the primary responsibility for administering the
Act lies with the Administrator of the EPA, 7 Congress specifically
recognized and preserved the rights of states "to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution .... ,,"'
Congress was careful, however, to preserve a
significant federal oversight role in states with approved programs.59
As stated above, the principal mechanism for controlling water
pollution is the NPDES permit program." The NPDES permit program is
also an entry point for states into the federal water pollution control effort.
Under section 402, states that want to administer the federal program can
petition the EPA for approval of their own permit program to control the
discharge of pollutants into waters under the jurisdiction of the state."
Each approved state administers the program under state law, but the goals
of the federal law accomplish two functions: 1) they guide each approved
56

See id. See also supra notes 24 to 34 and accompanying text.

See CWA § 101(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1994) ("Except as otherwise expressly
provided in this chapter, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency...
'7

shall administer this chapter.").
" CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). See also Hodas, supra note 30, at 1555 (1995)
("Although the objectives, goals and policies of the CWA are national in scope, Congress
envisioned that the responsibility for meeting these national ends would be shared by the
federal government and the states, which would have the primary responsibility to
'prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."') (quoting CWA § 101(b)).
" See, e.g., United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 742-45 (1981) (discussing
the ultimate oversight role of the federal EPA).
' See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (1977).
See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992).
61 See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) ("[T]he Govemor of each State desiring to
administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its
jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the
program it proposes to establish and administer under State law.").
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state when they develop their state clean water laws, and 2) they direct the
content of the state-issued NPDES permit. 62 By setting the overall
objectives which drive the permit program, Congress intended to create
consistent requirements for the regulated facilities subject to a NPDES
permit, no matter where those facilities may be found.63
The permit program was administered initially by the EPA
exclusively, but it was the intent of Congress that states "play a major role
in this program." 6 This sentiment is outlined clearly in the legislative
history of the Act:
The Committee believes that, after a transition period
during which the State program and capability will be
upgraded, the [NPDES permit] program should be
administered by those States with programs which meet the
requirements of this Act. Therefore, the bill provides that
after a State submits a program which meets the criteria
established by the Administrator pursuant to regulations,
the Administrator shall suspend his [permit issuance]
activity in such State under the Federal permit program. 65
Only by meeting the requirements of the federal CWA can a State be
approved to administer the program.'
The Act, however, creates an
affirmative duty on the part of the EPA to approve any state program that
meets the federal criteria.67 At the present time, forty-two states have been
62See

40 CFR §§ 122-123 (1997).
63See Kirsten H. Engel, State EnvironmentalStandard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is
It "To the Bottom"?, 48 Hastings L.J. 271, 293 (1997).
[N]ationally uniform standards ... create a 'level playing field' for
geographically scattered industries ....Because... a steel plant sited
on Puget Sound is subject to the same level of controls as a steel plant
located on a Virginia stream; the steel plant in Washington does not
gain a market advantage over the Virginia plant as a result of
environmental compliance costs and Virginia is freed from the worry
that its plant will relocate to Washington on the basis of more lax

standards alone.
Id.
64 S. REP. No. 92-414 (1971), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3737.
65 ITd.
66See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).

67 See id. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) ("The Administrator shall approve each such
submitted program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist.").
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approved by the EPA to administer the NPDES pennit program, including
the Commonwealth of Virginia.6" These states have the lead responsibility
not only to issue permits, but also to conduct inspections, review reports
from regulated facilities, ensure that each permitted facility complies with
the requirements in their permit, and report to the EPA on their progress in
implementing the federal program.69 Even though approved states take the
lead responsibility to implement the federal program in their jurisdictions,
the EPA continues to oversee the state's activities, especially with regard
to permit issuance7" and enforcement.71
Even in states approved to implement the federal program, the
EPA retains concurrent enforcement authority and its primary
responsibility to implement the Act under section 101(d). 72 Therefore, the
EPA assumes an oversight role in approved NPDES states mandated by
the Act that it cannot relinquish. On the other hand, once the NPDES
permit program has been "delegated,"7' the EPA cannot dictate to the State
how it should implement its approved program. 74 This has caused what
has been described as "EPA's tightrope walk between the need for
national consistency and state flexibility in implement[ing]" the national
68

See id. One non-state jurisdiction, the Virgin Islands, has also been approved to

administer the federal NPDES permit program. See id.
69See id. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); CWA § 305(b), 33 U.S.C. 1315(b).
70 See § 402(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1)
("Each State shall transmit to the
Administrator a copy of each permit application received by such State and provide
notice to the Administrator of every action related to the consideration of such permit
application, including each permit proposed to be issued by such State.").
71See CWA § 402(h), 33 U.S.C. 1342(h).
72
See CWA §§ 101(d), 309, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(d), 1319.
sThe term "delegation" is often used to describe the process of approving a State permit
program, but it is a misleading misnomer that should not be confused with the EPA
providing authority to a state. When the EPA approves a State program, it does so after
reviewing the authority granted to a State agency (or group of agencies) under State law.
The EPA does not "delegate" authority to a state, it only approves a State program based
on the authority contained in State law as per the requirement of § 402(b). This article
will use the term "approved" to describe State programs with primary jurisdiction to
implement the federal program.
'7See James R. Elder, Regulation of Water Quality: Is EPA Meeting its Obligations or
Can the States Better Meet Water Quality Challenges?, in 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,029. See also Hodas, supra note 30, at 1574 ("Heavy reliance on state
enforcement is a double-edged sword. When we 'deputize' the states to implement
national environmental laws, we shift the government's discretionary enforcement power
to state and local officials, who may not be interested in, or able to carry out, federal
goals.")
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mandates of the CWA.75
By creating this structure, Congress affirmed one of the most
"enduring centerpieces of American constitutional and political history"--the concept of federalism.76 Our federalist structure grew out of conflict."
Our Constitution and the structure of government it
established were the product of compromise between
proponents of a powerful national government and
advocates of broad state sovereignty. The system of dual
sovereignty established by the Constitution has been hailed
as a unique political achievement. Yet, federalism is the
one structural element in the Constitution whose meaning
and contours have been fraught with the most uncertainty.78
This uncertainty can turn to downright hostility when the federal
government and the various states disagree on the normative commitment
to federally mandated goals.79 This federalist tension lies at the heart of
water pollution control in this country and arose, in part, out of a history of
state failure" to enforce water quality standards prior to the adoption of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.1
Prior to 1972, the states held almost exclusive control over water
quality regulation. The exclusive reliance on state authority failed to
protect water quality in large part because the states lacked the will to
antagonize powerful political constituencies by enforcing environmental
standards.82 The dilemma faced by states was stated clearly by Governor
5Elder, supranote 74, at 10,029.
76

Dave Frohnmayer, A New Look at Federalism:The Theory and Implications of "Dual

Sovereignty, " 12 ENVTL. L. 903, 903 (1982).
"See Percival, supra note 43, at 1141.
78 Id. at 1143 (citation
omitted).
79See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National
Perspective)for FederalEnvironmentalProtection, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225,
312-13
(1997).
8
oSee Percival, supranote 43, at 1142.
SI Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
82 A second reason for the failure of water pollution control under the previous federal
statutes is not related to the reliance on State authority. The first comprehensive federal
statute addressing water pollution control was the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act. See
Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (superseded by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972). Despite the attempts of Congress to
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Anderson of Minnesota in his remarks before the House Committee on
Public Works:
I suggest there is one insight which should be shared with
you. I suggest that every Governor in the country knows
what is the greatest political barrier to effective pollution
control. It is the threat of our worst polluters to move their
factories out of any State that seriously tries to protect its
environment. It is the practice of playing one State against
the other. It is the false but strident cry of the polluter that
clean air and water mean fewer jobs.
Every Governor in this country knows that when he
tries to put some teeth into his State's anti-pollution laws,
his efforts will be met by precisely these sort of threats.
My message to you today is this: the answer to
threats is uniformity. The only way to stop polluters from
political intimidation is to prevent them from raising the
alternative of moving to a place where pollution is allowed.

strengthen the enforcement provisions of the Act through repeated amendments,
interminable delays and impediments remained. In the twenty years prior to 1972, only
one case reached the courts. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1423. The
procedural delays were exacerbated by the fact that a suit could only proceed with the
consent of the State where the pollution occurred. See Act of June 30, 1948, § 2(d)(4).
Beyond this, to enforce the Act, the federal government was required to show that a
specific polluter had endangered the health or welfare of persons in an adjacent state.
See Act of June 30, 1948, § 2(d)(1). Polluters were immune to prosecution if they only
endangered the health of citizens within a given state. See id. The 1965 amendments to
the Act removed the required showing of actual harm to health or welfare, and it
addressed water pollution by requiring the imposition of ambient water quality standards,
i.e., standards that set the quality of the water in a given stream or other water body, but
no specific requirements were established for those facilities which discharged into the
water body. See Act of Oct. 2, 1965, § 5(c), Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903, 907-08.
See also Hodas, supra note 30, at 1554. Therefore, if the standard were violated, the
government was required to prove that a particular polluter caused the violation of the
water quality standard in the stream. See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of
Exhortation: The CongressionalPrescriptionfor Vigorous FederalEnforcement of the
Clean WaterAct, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 202, 214 (1987). The government was given a
nearly impossible task, since every facility on the stream could claim innocence and
point their finger at someone else. Without the ability to enforce the law, the law became
meaningless. See, e.g., Hodas, supra note 33, at 1554 (discussing the Cuyahoga River in
Ohio and the small scale enforcement which could come about only after the river caught
fire).
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There should be no such place in this country.13
The tendency to centralize environmental regulation at the federal level
crystallized around the failure of states to address the problem. As we
have seen, however, Congress was not willing to cede total control of
water quality regulation to the federal government.84 States continue to
play a significant role in this effort, but, as the Smithfield case
demonstrated,85 they still confront the same political pressures identified
by Governor Anderson in his remarks. 6
The system which has evolved from the statutory construction of
the CWA, and which is present in most federal environmental statutes, has
been called "cooperative federalism."87 States are not required to adopt the
federal water pollution control program.88 They have a choice either to
adopt the program (i.e., to submit a program package for approval to the
EPA) or to allow the EPA to administer the program directly in their
state. 9 States can choose to adopt the federal mandate, or they can choose
to ignore the federal mandate.
What Congress may not do is
"commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.""
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 472-73.
See Percival, supra note 43, at 1172.
85 See United States v. Smithfield, Inc. 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997).
Political
83

pressure within states to be lax in environmental enforcement is a very real problem. See
generally Engel, supra note 63 (analyzing the so-called "race to the bottom"). Critics
contend that such a race was going on in Virginia prior to Smithfield. See, e.g., Letter
from W. Michael McCabe, Regional Administrator, Region III, Environmental
Protection Agency, to Thomas C. Hopkins, Director, Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality 1-3 (Sept. 19, 1996) (citing Virginia's weak environmental
enforcement record and interference with federal enforcement efforts); Wishy-Washy on
WaterPollution,Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 1996, at Al ("Virginia Gov. Allen... had best not
mention the waters of the Commonwealth where his administration has had a certifiably
poor record in enforcing environmental laws.").
16 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote 22, at 472-73.
87 See John M. Stafford, Environmental Law, Tenth Circuit Survey for September 1993December
1994, 72 DENV. U.L. REV. 685, 685 (1995).
88
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
89 See Sarnoff, supra note 79, at 236-38.
See also Percival, supra note 43, at 1166;
Stafford, supra note 87, at 691 ("As long as states have the real choice to deny the
federal mandate and accept the consequence, the cooperative federalism approach is not
in danger of constitutional challenge.").
90 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 170 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
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"As long as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution,
it may impose its will on the States"' by regulating in areas traditionally
regulated by the states. Once approved, however, the State is intended to
become the "primary front-line delivery agent ' 92 for the federal program
while the EPA maintains its statutory role of ensuring that states
implement the Act's mandates appropriately.
C. Enforcement of Environmental Law-Theories of Environmental
Protection
Perhaps the most compelling issue in the state/federal partnership
arises in the arena of enforcement. Whereas the relationship between the
states and the federal government is relatively straightforward with respect
to permitting, considerable discretion is introduced as the focus shifts to
enforcing the requirements of the law.93 Unlike the statutory stipulations
for issuing NPDES permits, where the EPA is generally precluded from
issuing permits in an approved state,94 the EPA retains its authority to
enforce all NPDES permits, even in states which have been approved to
administer the program.95 This simultaneous enforcement presence can
create a clash of conflicting priorities as each sovereign attempts to
enforce the NPDES program according to its particular perspectives.96
This conflict can originate from two distinct yet related sources. The first
is the inherent tension created by our federalist political structure, while
the second can stem from a general philosophical difference between the
9'Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991).
92

JOINT COMMITTEE TO REFORM OVERSIGHT AND CREATE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL

(1995).
9'Compare CWA § 402(b)(2)(B)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(2)(B)(7) (1994) (allowing the
EPA Administrator to approve any state program "including civil and criminal penalties
and other ways and means of enforcement") with CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319
(detailing very specifically how the EPA administrator is to go about federal
enforcement.).
4See CWA § 402(c). In limited circumstances, the EPA may issue a NPDES permit in
an approved state. See id. § 402(d)(4). The EPA, however, always has the authority to
veto permits proposed by approved states. See id. § 402(d)(2).
9
' See CWA § 402(i) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of
the Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 of this title.").
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM 1

ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA
ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS 1 (1986) [hereinafter POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA
ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS].
96 See U.S.
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federal government and the states regarding the purpose and goal of
enforcement, both generally and with respect to an individual violator.97
The primary conflict between the States and the federal
government in environmental regulation arises from one of the
psychological foundations of the U.S. Constitution: the fear of
concentrated power.98 As a check on national power, "State and local
governments are strong and fiercely battle every federal intrusion onto
their turf." Congress recognized from the start that the dual enforcement
scheme contemplated in the CWA had the potential to create a degree of
confusion and conflict.'" True to expectation, enforcement has become
the single most important focal point for conflict between the states and
the federal government in CWA regulation. '
The CWA is a strict
2
liability statute.
Therefore, there need not be any intent to violate for
liability to attach to the noncompliant discharge or to the person creating
the discharge. Once liability is established, however, the administering
agency has considerable latitude in choosing what kind of remedy to
impose, whether it be injunctive relief or civil sanction.'0 3
The
discretionary nature of CWA enforcement" 4 throws fuel on an already
combustible relationship between the federal government and the states.
The second conflict between the federal government and the States
in CWA enforcement can arise from a difference in perspective regarding
the use and function of civil penalties. There are two broad ways of
viewing environmental enforcement.'0 5 One way emphasizes the use of
97

See generally POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS,

supra note 96.
9'See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of IlliberalDemocracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997,
at 38.
99Id.at39.
'1o
See S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 69, reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729.
"0See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra
note 2 (statement of Christophe A.G. Tulou, Secretary, Delaware Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control) [hereinafter Tulou Statement].
102 See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994); Stoddard v. Western Carolina
Regional Sewer Authority, 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Earth
Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); California Public Interest Research
Group v. Shell Oil Co., 840 F. Supp. 712, 714-15. (N.D. Cal. 1993).
o3See CWA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1997).
04 See Telephone Interview with Richard Witt, Assistant Counsel, United States
Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Witt Interview]. See
generally Andreen, supra note 86 (discussing EPA enforcement history and strategies,
and emphasizing the discretionary nature of these actions).
10See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1567.
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punitive damages such as civil penalties, i.e., a sanctioning perspective,
and the other way stresses the need to obtain compliance and achieve
desired environmental objectives, i.e., a compliance-assistance strategy. 6
These differing approaches to environmental enforcement can be used
(and often are used) as complementary tools within an overall enforcement
scheme, since they are not incompatible in a broad enforcement strategy;
but they cannot be used simultaneously in a given case. The conflict
emerges when both systems of enforcement are brought to bear on a single
defendant.
Many states are reticent to pursue a sanction-based approach to
enforcement, eschewing it in favor of a more cooperative strategy which
seeks compliance with national environmental objectives as its ultimate
goal.1"7 The most important policy goal sought in this approach is to
achieve the environmental quality objectives of the CWA108 Proponents
of this approach assert that the success of an environmental enforcement
program should be measured not by the number of actions taken or the
amount of penalties obtained (the derisive term for this is "bean
counting"'") but by the environmental bottom line, i.e., the benefits to the
environment achieved by the action." 0 In this view, the larger goal of
environmental policy is to improve the environment."' Enforcement, as a
tool of overall environmental policy, is used to ensure compliance with
national environmental quality goals and standards. "2 The emphasis of
this approach is to use enforcement to get environmental results and is not
concerned with the "typical 'bean counting' exercises that continue to
o See id.

107

See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra

note 2, at 188 (statement of Mark Coleman, Executive Director, Oklahoma Department
of Environmental Quality); Hodas, supra note 30, at 1568. See, e.g., Tulou Statement,
supra note 101 ("In Delaware, we work with violators to get them back into compliance
as quickly as possible. Using compliance assistance as an option of first choice, we can
usually achieve that goal much faster, cheaper, and with-far greater goodwill than
through aggressive enforcement.").
"' See 1997 HearingBefore the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra
note 2, at 188 (statement of Mark Coleman, Executive Director, Oklahoma Department

of Environmental Quality).
"0Bruce M. Diamond, Confessions of an Environmental Enforcer, 26 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,252, 10,253.

"o See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra
note 2, at 200 (statement of Patricia S. Bangert, Director of Legal Policy, Attorney
General's Office, State of Colorado).
11
See id. at 199.
" 2 See Tulou Statement, supra note 101.

400

WM. & MARY ENVTL.

L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 23:381

characterize traditional enforcement." " 3
Cooperation is the centerpiece of this approach. Those who adopt
this approach tend to be more "conciliatory in style.""' 4 They view their
task as:
bringing the specific violator into compliance with the law
[more] than with either punishing violators or deterring
future violations with civil penalties and other sanctions.
Adherents to the compliance perspective tend to be
adjudication
averse, preferring
ongoing working
relationships with violators over adversarial interaction.
They utilize private negotiations with violators that result in
extended incremental advances that accommodate the
economic interests of the regulated community." 5
The proper role of government, in this view, is to work with a facility to
make sure that they return to compliance as soon as possible. The exercise
of a sanction-based enforcement system, in this context, is considered a
failure, or at best a provocative challenge, instead of a success.116
Under a compliance-assistance philosophy, penalties do not play a
significant role." 7 It is not surprising, then, that penalties imposed by
states adopting this philosophy are generally far lower than those obtained
by the federal government." 8 The reluctance to use penalties stems from a
fear that using such sanctions will force businesses to leave the state in
search of more congenial business climates." 9 In this relationship, states
are dependent on the mobile source of capital, i.e., industry, for jobs and

".. 1997 HearingBefore the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra note 2,
192-93 (statement of Becky Norton Dunlop, Secretary of Natural Resources,
Commonwealth of Virginia) [hereinafter Dunlop Statement].
"" Hodas, supra note 30, at 1567.

115 Id.

See Dunlop Statement, supra note 113; Tulou Statement, supra note 101. See also
Michael M. Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 21 ("There
is a paradox in counting as a 'success' an enforcement action that penalizes and returns to
compliance
a facility that has been a failure in living up to its obligations.").
117 See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1615.
"' See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra
116

note 2, at 186 (statement by Nikki L. Tinsley, Acting Inspector General, Environmental
Protection Agency).
"9 See Engel, supra note 63, at 290; Hodas, supranote 30, at 1615.
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economic welfare.'
Economic considerations, possibly more than
anything else, lie at the heart of the divergence between a sanction-based
enforcement perspective and a compliance assistance-based enforcement
strategy.' The conflict between the federal government and many States
in environmental enforcement mirrors this divergence, since economic
threats do not affect the federal government to nearly the same degree
experienced by states."
It was in response to this situation that Congress directed the
federal government to impose uniform minimum national standards on
industry and other sources of pollution so that companies would be less
inclined to shop around for states willing to forego environmental
protection in favor of economic development.'" The CWA pre-empts the
states as the primary environmental standard setters.'2 4 In doing so,
Congress achieved two purposes. First, it elevated pollution control and
the resulting environmental improvement to the level of a right. 2 Second,
Congress prevented states from using the environmental standard-setting
forum as a means to compete for industry with rival states. 6 The
conventional wisdom is that states, in pursuing their individual economic
self interest, compete for industry by providing the incentive of lax
pollution control standards, resulting in a devolving spiral labeled a "raceto-the-bottom," i.e., a race to laxity in environmental protection and a
reduction in social welfare.'27 Even though this conventional wisdom has
been challenged with regard to its effect on social welfare, 2 1 there is wide
..See Engel, supra note 63, at 294.
121 See id. at 294-95.
'22 See id. at 290.
2

See id. at 294.
See id. at 291.
'2' See id. at 288-89.
12 6 See id. at 291.
27 See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 67, 80 (1996).
121 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1210, 1211 (1992).
This Article challenges the accepted wisdom on the race to the bottom.
It argues that, contrary to prevailing assumptions, competition among
states for industry should not be expected to lead to a race that
decreases social welfare; indeed, as in other areas, such competition
can be expected to produce an efficient allocation of industrial activity
among the states.
124
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agreement that such competition between states takes place.129 Therefore,
states are placed in the difficult position of regulating facilities on which
3
they depend for their economic well being. 1
Using a compliance assistance-based enforcement approach is
designed to achieve the environmental quality goals of the statute and, for
many enforcement situations, this is an adequate and appropriate response.
However, if it is used as the sole enforcement strategy, it cannot address
the inequities created by companies that violate the law when compared to
timely compliance by law-abiding facilities and it fails to influence the
behavior of recalcitrant or recidivist violators.'
The EPA, therefore,
adopts a more expansive focus in its enforcement program.
While the
ultimate goal of the EPA's enforcement program is compliance with the
law and achieving our environmental objectives, the use of the EPA's
enforcement powers is also designed to serve a variety of other policy
objectives. 3 1 Inevitably, achieving these other policy objectives involves
3
the use of penalties and the purpose for which a penalty is desired. 1
The most important policy goals that the EPA seeks to achieve
with its enforcement program are: 1) to protect public health and the
environment and 2) to guarantee equity. 3 The first prong of the EPA's
enforcement program is designed to compel compliance with the law so
that the environmental goals set by statute can be realized. 36 The
environmental goals of the CWA are broad declarations of intent, but such
Id.
129 See Engel, supra note 63, at 283 ("Professor Revesz is claiming not that states fail to
relax their standards as a result of interstate competition, but that the relaxation of
standards
does not occasion any lessening in social welfare.").
130 See id. at 274.
131 See Stahl, supra note 116, at 20.
13 2 See id. at 21.
133 See Engel, supra note 63, at 284.
13 4 See GAO, WATER POLLUTION: MANY VIOLATIONS HAVE NOT RECEIVED APPROPRI-

RESPONSE, GAO/RCED-96-23, at 12 (1996) ("[P]enalties play a key
role in environmental enforcement by ensuring that regulated entities are treated fairly
and consistently so that no one gains a competitive advantage by violating environmental
ATE ENFORCEMENT

regulations.").
135
See U.S. ENVTL.

PROTECTION AGENCY, CORE

ASSURANCE FUNCTIONS 1

EPA

ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE

(1996). The goal of the Agency enforcement program is

outlined in the following manner, "to assure the protection of public health and the
environment, and to assure that polluters do not gain a competitive advantage over those
regulated
entities that comply with federal environmental requirements." Id.
136 See id.
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declarations do not achieve results by themselves.137 Only by complying
with the law's mandates can we accomplish the nation's larger
environmental goals. Violating environmental requirements frustrates our
ability to achieve the environmental results envisioned by the law.'38 The
primary thrust of the EPA's enforcement program, therefore, is to ensure a
base threshold of compliance with the law. 3 9 Accordingly, the EPA's
enforcement strategy incorporates the compliance assistance-based
perspective in its entirety and uses it as the initial premise for its
enforcement approach. 4
The EPA's enforcement program, however, does not end there.
The EPA uses punitive enforcement measures in those instances where
assistance efforts or informal enforcement are not successful in achieving
compliance. 4 ' This second prong of the EPA's enforcement program is
designed to achieve the public policy objective of ensuring equity in the
imposition of environmental requirements.' 42 Equity is served by ensuring
that "law abiding businesses have a level economic playing field on which
to compete."'43 Facilities that comply on time need to have the assurance
37

'

See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1553 ("[L]aws by themselves do not accomplish any of

these [environmental] goals; only widespread compliance with the law can bring about
the desired ends.").
131See id. at 1554.
139
See id. at 1557 n.25.
140 Indeed, the EPA has organized its enforcement office-the Office of Enforcement
and
Compliance Assurance-to incorporate both functions. See generally Memorandum
from Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, on New
Strategic Enforcement Organization (Oct. 12, 1993) (on file with the author). See also
Herman Statement, supranote 2.
In partnership with industry, academic institutions, environmental
groups, other Federal agencies, and the States, EPA has established its
national Compliance Assistance Centers. The purpose of the centers is
to improve compliance by increasing awareness of the pertinent
Federal regulatory requirements and providing information that will
help to achieve compliance. The centers accomplish this by serving as
the first place that businesses, trade associations, and other interested
parties can go to get comprehensive, easy to understand compliance
information.
Id.
141

See id.

142See 1997 HearingBefore the Committee on Environmental and Public Works, supra

note 2, at 61 (statement of Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Environment and
Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
143
Herman Statement, supra note 2.
LT]he public expects the regulated community to obey the law and fully
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that in doing so they are not placing themselves at a competitive
disadvantage. Complying with environmental regulations usually costs
money. If it didn't, there would be far less need for an enforcement
program because there would be no disincentive to comply.
Unfortunately, treatment technologies or other capital expenditures are
often needed to produce the necessary effluent quality required by the
NPDES permit and these technologies involve costs: both-initially, in the
form of capital investment, and over time, in the form of annual or other
continuing expenses.'" These expenses are unlikely to yield any direct
economic benefit to the company. 4 ' Instead, investing in such equipment
diverts funds that could be used by the firm for other income-producing
activities. This creates a strong disincentive to comply with the effluent
limits established in the facility's permit.
The use of penalties, therefore, is an essential component of an
equity-driven enforcement program, where the violations being addressed
by the enforcement action have resulted in an economic benefit to the
violator.'" If no such benefit exists, the pre-eminent goal of the
enforcement action is to achieve compliance as quickly as possible'47 so
that any environmental damage caused by the violations is minimized.
The EPA's enforcement program, therefore, is largely predicated on the
use of penalties to address violations of the Act which could result in an
economic advantage being gained by the violator. 4 In such instances,
"the Agency uses its penalty authority to remove or neutralize the
economic incentive to violate environmental regulations."' 49 If the penalty
comply with applicable regulations and also expects EPA to take

tough, but fair action against those who fail to do so. We also know
that regulated entities that comply with environmental requirements
expect, and rightly so, EPA to hold noncomplying entities accountable
for violations that may place the violators at a competitive advantage.
Id.
144
See id.
' In some cases, however, the company may experience an economic benefit from
compliance. In the Smithfield case, the company actually generated income (in excess of
its costs for that portion of the system) from the solids produced by its waste treatment
system once it was finally installed. See discussion infra notes 481-523.
" See GAO, supra note 134, at 12.
14 7 See Stahl, supranote 116, at 22.
148 See Diamond, supra note 109, at 10,252 ("EPA has relied almost exclusively
on
punitive enforcement to encourage compliance."). Traditional enforcement approaches,
however, have recently begun to be questioned, not just by states, but by officials within
the EPA. See e.g., Stahl, supra note 116, at 19.
149 U.S.

ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,

BEN: A

MODEL TO CALCULATE THE ECONOMIC
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is set correctly, it ensures the equitable imposition of regulatory
requirements across all facilities because it prevents any competitor from
getting an unfair cost-saving by virtue of its illegal conduct. 5 ° According
to this view, simply compelling compliance with the law is insufficient if
it allows protracted delays that may create a significant economic
advantage for the noncompliant facility.'
The longer a company is
allowed to delay, the greater the benefit accrued.'52 Therefore, where
delayed compliance has resulted in a substantial economic benefit, the use
of a penalty is vital to redress the resulting inequity.'
Beyond these primary policy objectives (i.e., concerns for
compliance and equity), the EPA views its enforcement program as
serving a variety of salutary purposes." 4 It "punishes wrongdoers, deters
potential violators, brings actual violators into compliance, and can ensure
that damage to the environment is rectified."'55 The use of penalties is
capable not only of creating an equitable imposition of requirements, it
can also punish individuals who violate the law, and it can provide an
incentive to comply in the future.'56 If a penalty is set simply at the level
where the violator is economically indifferent between compliance and
noncompliance, then there is an incentive for the company to continue its
attempts to evade the law because being caught only places it where it
should have been if it had complied. 7 Therefore, there is a need to set the
penalty beyond the economic benefit of noncompliance to account for the
seriousness of the violation and to create a deterrent effect. 58 Deterrence
is vital because it is not possible to address every instance of
noncompliance individually.'59
By using well-publicized punitive
enforcement actions, the government can obtain compliance based on fear
BENEFITS OF NONCOMPLIANCE-USERS MANUAL, EPA 300-B-94-002, at 1-5 (1993)

[hereinafter
NONCOMPLIANCE-USERS
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See
15

MANUAL].

id.

See id.

" See id.
'15
Herman Statement, supra note 2.
156
See id.
"57 See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra

note 2, at 186 (Statement of Nikki Tinsley, Acting Inspector General, EPA).
158
See id.
159 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) ("The legislative history
of the
Act reveals that Congress wanted the district court to consider the need for retribution
and deterrence, in addition to restitution, when it imposed civil penalties.").
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of detection and sanction.6". These concepts form the bedrock of the
EPA's settlement penalty calculations and are a core element
of the federal
6
'
program.1
enforcement
environmental
government's CWA
Furthermore, it is inevitable that enforcement agencies encounter
individuals who, for a variety of reasons, believe that they do not need to
follow the requirements of the law. They may believe that the law is
unjust, or that it is simply too burdensome, or, more commonly, they will
purport to have sufficient, self-serving reasons not to comply, i.e., moral
or other reasons that place the individual's self-interest above the public
policy goals of the law.' 62 When the issue is environmental regulation,
these self-regarding reasons are almost always economic in nature and are
used to justify "trumping" the legitimate mandates of duly-enacted laws. 63
Such recalcitrant or recidivist violators will never be pursuaded to comply
on their own without the threat of punitive sanction."
A basic public policy premise of the Act is that the person who
creates the discharge of pollutants must take responsibility for those
pollutants. 165 The CWA presumes a state of compliance with its mandates,
since the discharge of any pollutant from a point source not in accordance
with its directives is illegal.'66 Therefore, if a discharger cannot comply
with the requirements of the law, a viable option is to cease its discharge
of pollutants. 67 If the violations are continuing and severe, and if the
discharger chooses to ignore the requirements of the law, then punishment
becomes a valid enforcement option. 6
This reality of the law has
,60 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM CLEAN WATER ACT SETrLEMENT
2 (1995) [hereinafter INTERIM PENALTY POLICY] ("This Policy is
drafted so that violators whose actions, or inactions, resulted in a significant economic
benefit and/ or harmed or threatened the public health or the environment will pay the
highest penalties.").
161 See id.
62
1 See JEAN HAMPTON, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 5 (1997).
163 See NONCOMPLIANCE-USERS MANUAL, supranote 149, at 5.
'64 See id.
16 5 See INTERIM PENALTY POLICY, supra note 160, at 2.
PENALTY POLICY

'66

See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).

See also supra note 28 and

accompanying text.
167 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d. 1128, 1141-42
(11th Cir. 1990) ("There was one simple and straightforward way for Tyson to avoid
paying civil penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act: After puchasing the plant,
Tyson could have ceased operations until it was able to discharge pollutants without

violating the requirements of its NPDES permit.").
161See

id. at 1142 ("Tyson chose not to do this and it must not now bear the
consequences of that decision.").
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prompted one court to conclude that "[t]he CWA is strong medicine,"' 69
but pollution control and punishment continue to be viable interests of
federal enforcement policy because they serve a basic sense of justice. 70
In the absence of a vigorous environmental enforcement program, the
requirements of the law can become merely symbolic.' Without effective
enforcement, achieving the law's objectives becomes impossible no matter
how stringent the laws may be.'72
D. The EPA/State Relationship in CWA Enforcement-The Statutory and
Policy Framework
Given the conflicts that exist in the dual enforcement scheme of the
CWA, a series of important questions arise. The simplest and most
fundamental question is when should the EPA enforce the CWA directly
against a violating facility in an approved state? Beyond this basic
situation lies an even more intriguing and complicated inquiry: if the EPA
decides to enforce the CWA directly in an approved state when that state
is already acting on its own, which jurisdiction's authority prevails; and
under what circumstances would the EPA pursue such enforcement in the
first place?
Section 309(a), interestingly, begins with a specific case: a
violation of a permit issued by an approved NPDES state. 73 From this

169
170

Texas MunicipalPowerAgency v. EPA, 836 F.2d 1482, 1488 (5th Cir. 1988).
See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,

576 (1996) ("Our sense of justice and fairness thus is offended when pollution harms go
uncompensated or uncontrolled."). See also Michael J. Sandel, It's Immoral to Buy the
Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, § op. ed. ("If a company or a country is
fined for spewing excessive pollutants into the air, the community conveys its judgment
that the polluter has done something wrong.").
17. See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1558 n.29.
72 See id. The experience of the former Soviet Union is a classic example of this
tendency. See id. (citing MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE
USSR: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE 1-14).

On paper, the Soviet Union had extensive, stringent environmental
laws and regulations, but there was no enforcement of those laws....
Without enforcement, there also has been no compliance with the
environmental laws, which are now a sham, 'a false front over grubby
reality.' . . . As a result, Russia suffers from widespread, severe, even
catastrophic environmental contamination.
Id.
173 See CWA § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1994).
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perspective, it outlines the EPA's enforcement responsibility.174 It is,
perhaps, an indication of the central importance of this issue that Congress
chose to introduce the discussion of CWA enforcement with the case of
federal enforcement in an approved state. In such a situation, the statute
provides two courses of action for the Administrator. 7 ' The first course
recognizes that federal enforcement power is concurrent with State
enforcement authority and allows the Administrator to proceed directly
either to issue an order requiring compliance under section 309(a)(3),' 76 or
to initiate a civil action for appropriate relief under 309(b)." 7 Under this
option, the Administrator is not required to await State enforcement
action."7 The second course of action is to notify both the person alleged
to be in violation and the approved state.179 If this option is taken, the
174
175

See id.
See id.

Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any condition or
limitation which implements section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1328, or 1345 of this title in a permit issued by a State under an
approved permit program under section 1342 or 1344 of this title, he
shall proceed under his authority in paragraph (3) of this subsection or
he shall notify the person in alleged violation and such State of such
finding. If beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's
notification the State has not commenced appropriate enforcement
action, the Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such condition or limitation or shall bring a civil action in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
76
' See CWA § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3).

Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation of section 1311,
1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or is in violation of
any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in
a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by him or by a State or
in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, he shall
issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section or
requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
" See CWA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) ("The Administrator is authorized to
commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary
injunction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under
subsection (a) of this section.").

178 See id.

See id.

179
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statute requires that the approved State be given thirty days to initiate
"appropriate" enforcement action. 8 If that State fails to commence such
an action, the Administrator is obliged either to issue an order for
compliance or to institute civil proceedings.' In the former case, the EPA
is not constrained in its ability to enforce against violations of a permit
issued by an approved state.'
In the latter case, the statute creates an
implied deference to State action in approved states.'
This ambiguity is
not resolved by an appeal to the legislative history.
Congress struggled with the idea of apportioning enforcement
responsibilities between the states and the federal government. 4 On the
one hand, the legislative history states that "[s]ection 309 requires the
Administrator to provide notice to a polluter and the State upon
discovering a violation of any effluent limitation."'' 5 On the other hand,
the history states that "[t]he Administrator also is required to issue a
compliance order or to bring a civil suit against the polluter."'8 6 These are
incompatible directions. Congress clearly expected the EPA to provide a
strong enforcement presence and stated that "[t]he Administrator must
issue an abatement order whenever there is a violation of the terms or
conditions of a permit."'8 7 But the general expectation was that the EPA
would rely for the most part on State enforcement:
Consistent with the general tenor of the Act, the Committee
expects that the Administrator will rely to the maximum
extent possible upon the enforcement actions of the
individual States. The Committee in providing for federal
enforcement does not intend to replace enforcement by the
States. The provisions of section 309 are supplemental to
those of the State and are available to the Administrator in
those cases where local, State, or interstate enforcement
agencies will not or cannot act expeditiously and
vigorously to enforce the requirements of the Act. The
Committee clearly intends that the greater proportion of
180
See id.
...
See CWA § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3).
182 See id.
183 See id.
'84

See LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 22, at 314.

185
Id.
186
187

Id.
Id. at 163.

410

WM. & MARY ENVTL.

L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 23:381

enforcement actions be brought by the States.' 8
This situation, however, raises the following question: when should the
EPA use its enforcement authority against violators of permit conditions in
an approved state?
To answer this question, the EPA promulgated a policy that
addresses these issues and guides the Agency's actions when it encounters
situations where direct federal enforcement is contemplated in an
approved state.'89 The Policy Frameworkfor State/EPA Enforcement
Agreements (the Policy Framework) was developed in conjunction with
the states, and it provides the blueprint for the state/federal enforcement
relationship."9 This policy directs the EPA and the states in situations
where dual enforcement authority exists, i.e., in approved State
programs.-91 It does so by defining the overall objective of environmental
enforcement and by laying out the respective "roles and responsibilities"'"
of each party. The overall objective of the Policy Framework is to achieve
and maintain "a high level of compliance with environmental laws and
regulations."'9 3
Beyond that, the Policy Framework reinforces the
conviction that the states have the primary responsibility for performing
compliance and enforcement activities within approved programs, but it
also reiterates a need for the EPA to ensure the "fair and effective
enforcement of federal requirements, and a credible national deterrence to
noncompliance."' 94 The policy clearly recognizes that the EPA may need
to use its enforcement authority to "support the broad national interest in
creating an effective deterrent to noncompliance beyond what a State may
need to do to achieve compliance in an individual case."'9 5
The Policy Framework cannot, and does not, dictate to the states
what their enforcement program should be. Rather, it has more of an
oversight function and it encourages states to adopt enforcement principles
used by the EPA, such as deterrence and equity, i.e., the use of penalties to

Id. at 802.
See generally POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 96.
,oSee id.
'gl See id. at 1.
192 Id. at 21.
193 Id. at 1.
'8
'8

194
195

Id.
Id.
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recover the economic benefit of noncompliance.'96 However, there is wide
discretion granted to the states to construct and implement their
enforcement programs as they see fit.'9 7 The policy goal of the State/EPA
enforcement relationship is for the states to have the primary responsibility
for initiating enforcement action. 98 The presumption of the Policy
Framework, however, is for the EPA to take direct enforcement action in
those situations "where a state is 'unwilling or unable' to take 'timely and
199
appropriate' enforcement action."'
EPA's policy is to take direct enforcement action in the following
types of cases: 1) where the state requests EPA action; 2) where a state
enforcement response is not timely and appropriate; 3) where there are
national precedents, either legal or programmatic; and 4) where there is a
violation of an EPA order or consent decree. 2" When the EPA decides to
initiate an enforcement action to address one of the four items outlined
above, it considers the following factors: 1) cases which are specifically
designated as nationally significant, e.g., situations of significant
noncompliance (SNC)2° ' as defined by national policy, or involving
explicit national or regional environmental priorities; 2) cases where there
is significant environmental or public health damage; 3) instances where
some significant economic benefit has been gained by the violator; 4)
where there are interstate issues, such as environmental impacts
transgressing state boundaries; and 5) if there have been repeat patterns of
violations and violators "where the state response is likely to prove
ineffective given the pattern of repeat violations and prior history of the
State's success in addressing past violations."2 2
The EPA will generally decline to exercise its enforcement
authority when the approved State has taken or will take "timely and
appropriate" enforcement action.0 3 In order to determine whether an
'96 See id. at8.
197
See id. at 5.
98

See id. at 21.

199
Id.
2

oo See id. at 21.
Significant Noncompliance in the NPDES program is defined by the magnitude and/or
frequency of violations of the permit's effluent limitations, as well as the nature of the
pollutant parameters being violated. See 40 CFR § 123.45, app. A (Criteria for
Noncompliance Reporting in the NPDES Program). See also CWA § 309(a)(1), 33
U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1994).
202 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 96, at
21-22.
203 See id.
201
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approved state is taking timely and appropriate enforcement action, the
EPA has developed a reporting system that each approved state must
follow.2" This reporting is triggered by a facility's designation as being in
SNC.20 Once a facility is in SNC, it must be reported to the EPA by the
approved NPDES State on a report called the quarterly noncompliance
report (QNCR).2" As the name implies, this report is issued every three
months and identifies facilities with the most serious violations of the
CWA. 2 7 By the time a facility is listed on the QNCR, the administering
agency (whether the EPA or an approved state) is expected to have already
initiated an enforcement action to achieve compliance. Prior to the facility
appearing on the subsequent QNCR, however, the facility is expected
either to be in compliance with its permit or the administering agency is
required to take a "formal" 2 °8 enforcement action.2' 9 This is considered to
be a timely response.210
The appropriateness of the action taken is evaluated from three
perspectives. 2 The first is whether compliance will be achieved and the
204

See id. at 31.

205 See U.S. ENVTL.

PROTECTION AGENCY, REVISIONS OF NPDES SIGNIFICANT

NONCOMPLIANCE (SNC) CRITERIA TO ADDRESS VIOLATIONS OF NON-MONTHLY
AVERAGE
LIMITS
(1995) [hereinafter REVISIONS OF NPDES SIGNIFICANT

NONCOMPLIANCE CRITERIA], 206 See 40 CFR § 123.45(a) (1997). See also Elder, supra note 74, at 10,030.
The national requirement of timely and appropriate enforcement
provides that, after one quarter of appearing on a publicly available
report called the 'quarterly noncompliance report,' the state must take
action to ensure that the facility does not reappear on the report. If it
does reappear, a report must be filed called the 'exceptions list,' stating
why no formal enforcement action or other action has been taken
against the facility to force that facility into compliance.
Elder, supra note 74, at 10,030.
207 See REVISIONS OF NPDES SIGNIFICANT NONCOMPLIANCE CRITERIA, supra note 205,
at 1.
20' U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR OVERSIGHT OF NPDES

PROGRAMS 166 (1987) [hereinafter NATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR OVERSIGHT OF NPDES

PROGRAMS]. "A formal enforcement action is defined as one that 'requires actions to
achieve compliance, specifies a timetable, contains consequences for noncompliance that
are independently enforceable without having to prove the original violation, and
the person to adverse legal consequences for noncompliance."' Id. at 166 n.7.
subjects
2
o9 See id. at 164.
20
See id. at 165.
2. See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note

96, at 22.
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second. is whether the schedule for compliance is unduly extended.2 12 The
third broad area of evaluation relates to the penalty and whether it is
appropriate to the nature of the illegal conduct. 3 The presumption is that
the EPA can take action if the remedies obtained by the state (i.e.,
injunctive relief and penalties) are clearly inappropriate to the violation.214
The remedy must correct the violation and cannot be extended
indefinitely through compliance schedules. 5 In terms of the penalty, the
Policy Framework indicates that it is appropriate for the EPA to pursue
penalties if the State has not assessed a penalty or if the "[S]tate penalty is
determined to be grossly deficient. 2 16 To evaluate whether the State
penalty is "grossly deficient," the policy evaluates the relationship of the
state penalty to the seriousness of the violation, the economic benefit
gained as a result of the noncompliance, and any other special, applicable
factors. 7 These principles uphold the sanction-based perspective of
enforcement.21 States are often quick to criticize this sanction-based focus
on the grounds that the federal government is forcing the states to become
"branch offices of EPA."2 19
Clearly, the enforcement relationship between the states and the
EPA, as laid out in the Policy Framework, is predicated on the twin pillars
of obtaining compliance and a belief in punitive enforcement.22 The
presumption is that the states will implement enforcement programs that
achieve high levels of compliance (thus ensuring that the national
environmental goals of the CWA are met) and that further the national
enforcement policy goals of equity and deterrence.2 1 The EPA's oversight
of state enforcement programs, therefore, is based on an assumption that
the states will act to curtail violations in a similar manner as the federal
government.2 2 This posture is anathema to many states.m Many State
212

213

See id. at 22-23.
See id. at 22-23.

214

See id.

215

See id.

216

1 d. at 23.

217

See id.
See id.
219
See Dunlop Statement, supranote 113.
220 See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATEIEPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note
218

96, at 1.

2 See generally id.

222

See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra

note 2, at 199 (statement of Patricia S. Bangert, Director of Legal Policy, Attorney
General's Office, State of Colorado).
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officials would prefer to have the EPA restrict itself to the role of
providing technical assistance, setting national standards, conducting
research, and facilitating national data collection efforts.224 In this role, the
EPA should not be concerned with "how a State handled each individual
enforcement matter.' 25 Rather, the states would be left to perform their
lead duties in direct program implementation and enforcement as they see
fit, bringing in the EPA as needed to resolve particular issues or problems
and to ensure overall program integrity.22 Within this state view of the
state/EPA enforcement relationship, there is a strict demarcation between
the respective party's roles, with neither party seeking "to pick off choice
227
plums from the other's role.
The uneasy nature of the federal/state enforcement relationship is
nowhere better represented than in the United States' case against
Smithfield Foods. 8 All of the elements of conflict are present in this
action: an economically (and, therefore, politically) powerful, private
constituent with long-standing violations of the conditions of its NPDES
permit; a significant economic benefit gained as a result of such
noncompliance; a State agency with an enforcement philosophy
emphasizing a cooperative relationship between the administering agency
and regulated entities; environmental impacts that do not respect state
boundaries; and the federal government seeking to achieve the twin goals
of equity and deterrence with its enforcement action.229 The interplay
between these forces comes to life as we examine the rationale used by the
federal government in its action to address this complex enforcement
action. But first we must set the stage to explain this rationale by
outlining the chronology of events in this intricate case.

' See id. at 198 ("EPA's perspective appears to be that they own the ranch and that we,
the states, are the hired ranch hands.").
224 See 1997 HearingBefore the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra
note 3, at 190 (statement of Mark Coleman, Executive Director, Oklahoma Department
of Environmental Quality).
m Id. at 189.
226 See id.
227 Id. at 190.
22

See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1997).

229

See generally id.
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UNITED STATES V. SMITHFIELD FOODSINC.-A CHRONOLOGY

A. The Approval of the Commonwealth of Virginia to Administer the
FederalNPDESPermitProgram
The Commonwealth of Virginia was approved to administer the
federal NPDES permit program on March 31, 1975.'* In transmitting its
approval of the program, the EPA simultaneously enclosed its approval of
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)" executed between the two
parties as part of the program approval process. 32 The purpose of the
MOU is to define mutually agreed upon "responsibilities in the area of
water quality control within the Commonwealth of Virginia." ' 3 This
document describes the respective roles of the EPA and the State in
general terms in various areas of program implementation, including
enforcement actions. 4 The enforcement section is a very broad statement
of responsibility." It enumerates the respective roles in these terms: "the
State Water Control Board shall be the primary enforcement agency with
respect to permits issued under the NPDES program, and the Regional
Administrator shall assume a strong supporting role."236 From these
modest beginnings, a twenty-two year enforcement relationship between
Virginia and the EPA has evolved.
B. The Development of the Commonwealth of Virginia's Water Quality
Standards: VR 680-21-00
The course of events which ultimately led to the United States'
action in the Smithfield case was triggered in May 1988 when Virginia

230

In 1975, there was no federal register notice of the approval of Virginia's NPDES

permit program. However, in subsequent CWA approvals, the March 31, 1975 date is
referenced in the federal register. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 18,592, Virginia'sPretreatment
ProgramApproval (1989) (proposed May 1, 1989).
2' See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
REGARDING PERMIT AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS BETWEEN THE STATE WATER
CONTROL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION I, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY (1975) [hereinafter MOU].
232
See
233

id. at 1.

Id.

234 See

235

id. at 1-2.
See id. at 11.

236 Id.
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adopted its definition of "Nutrient Enriched Waters" ' 7 and its "Policy for
This action
Nutrient Enriched Waters" 8 (the Nutrient Policy).
precipitated the initial conflict between Smithfield Foods and the state, and
it established the subsequent tenor of the relationship between these two
parties. 9 Virginia's definition of "nutrient enriched waters" and its
Nutrient Policy are part of the state's overall water quality standards.24 °
Virginia developed its water quality- standards in accordance with the
requirements in section 303(c)241 of the CWA, which requires states to
define the water quality goals of a given water body by designating the use
or uses to be made of the water and by setting numeric criteria necessary
to protect those uses.242 The State Water Quality Control Board (SWCB or
the "Board") of Virginia developed its water quality standards, in part, to
address situations of eutrophication (i.e., conditions of excess nutrients
which can create excessive phytoplankton growth and a consequent
increase in turbidity and a decrease in the water's oxygen
concentration).243 The presence of nutrients in sufficient quantities is
recognized by the State as "contributing to undesirable growths of aquatic
plant life in surface waters." 2'
The impetus for developing these regulations was the 1987
Chesapeake Bay Agreement (CBA).24 The CBA was initiated by the
legislatures of Virginia and Maryland in 1980 when they established the
Chesapeake Bay Commission.246 Pennsylvania joined the Commission in
1985, and by 1987, the District of Columbia and the EPA had "formally
agreed to a cooperative approach" for "managing the Chesapeake Bay as

" Definition of Nutrient Enriched Waters, 4:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 1649 (1988) [hereinafter
Definition of Nutrient Enriched Waters].
" Policy for Nutrient Enriched Waters, 4:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 1648 (1988) [hereinafter
Policy for Nutrient Enriched Waters].
9
,"
See Petition for Appeal, Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Virginia (Isle of Wight Co. Cir. Ct.
1998)
[hereinafter Petition for Appeal].
2
oSee Water Quality Standards, 8:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 2467 (1992).

See CWA § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1994).
See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK,
EPA-823-B-94-005a, 1-1 (2"d ed. 1994).
243 See Elder, supra note 74, at 10,029 ("the states are supposed to decide on their state
for that pollutant, through their scientific and political processes").
standard
2" Definition of Nutrient Enriched Waters, supranote 237, at 1649.
241

242

245

See CHESAPEAKE BAY COMMISSION, CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT

[hereinafter
246
See id.

CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT].

1 (1987)
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an integrated ecosystem. '
Further, the signatories to the CBA
committed to "specific actions" that included, among other things, a forty
percent reduction in nutrient (i.e. phosphorus and nitrogen) discharges into
the Chesapeake Bay by the year 2000.24 In signing this agreement, the
EPA and the other signed parties identified the control of nutrient
discharges into the Chesapeake Bay as a significant regional
environmental priority.24 9 To meet its commitment, Virginia's water
quality standards designate certain waters as being nutrient enriched, based
on "chlorophyll 'a' concentrations, dissolved oxygen fluctuations, and
concentrations of total phosphorus.""25 At the point where the Smithfield
Foods discharges occur, the Pagan River, a tributary to the Chesapeake
2
Bay, is designated as enriched under the state's water quality standard. 1
The discharges from Smithfield Foods contribute to eutrophication
because of the nature of the facility's operations and the resulting
wastewater produced by the company's manufacturing process.
Smithfield is a hog slaughtering and processing facility with an average
kill rate of approximately 8,000 hogs per day.252 The plant operations
include blood and hair collection, viscera handling, and edible and
inedible rendering. 253 Blood from the kill floor is collected and pumped to
processing facilities where it is centrifuged to separate the plasma from the
blood solids. 4 The plasma is discharged into the sewer while the blood
solids are dried and disposed of separately. 5 Hair is collected and
hydrolyzed (i.e., chemically decomposed) and then dried for disposal. 6
Stomachs are pumped and then scalded to be sold for edible
consumption. 7 Chitterlings and casings are saved with the contents

247

Id.,.

248 See
249 See
250

id. at 5-6.
id.

Definition of Nutrient Enriched Waters, supra note 237, at 1649-56.

See id. at 1650 ("Tidal freshwater James River from the fall line to the confluence of
the Chickohominy River (Buoy 70) including all tributaries to a distance five river miles
above their fall lines that enter the tidal freshwater James River.").
252 See WELLS ENGINEERS ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., STUDY AND REPORT: PHOSPHORUS
25'

REMOVAL:
SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., SMITHFIELD, VIRGINIA
WELLS ENGINEERS ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY].

253 See

id. at 2.
id.
255 See id.
256 See id.
257 See id.
2 See

1

(1990) [hereinafter
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pumped and discharged to the sewer. 25 ' A variety of rendering operations
exist at the plant, both for edible and inedible solids.259 These rendering
processes produce grease-bearing wastes that are treated at the plant.21 In
addition to the wastes from processing the carcasses, there are animal
wastes from the holding pens that are collected and pumped to a catch
" ' The nature of the plant process, from the kill floor
basin for treatment.26
to cutting and processing, is such that "nearly every operation within the
plant contributes nutrients" to the total waste flow. 262 Phosphorus, in
particular, comes from the blood, meat processing and renderings at the
263
plant.
The state's Nutrient Policy outlines the consequences for
Smithfield of the Pagan River being designated as enriched. 2" The
Nutrient Policy requires the State to reopen the NPDES permits of
facilities discharging to waters designated as enriched and to impose water
quality-based effluent limitations on the nutrients (principally phosphorus)
in those discharges in order to address eutrophication in the Chesapeake
Bay.26 Thus, the Nutrient Policy required the State to reopen Smithfield's
existing NPDES permit (which had been issued on May 13, 1986) and to
impose a monthly average total phosphorus effluent limitation of 2.0
milligrams per liter (mg/l).266 Smithfield was required to comply with that
limit "as quickly as possible and in any event within 3 years following
modification of the NPDES permit., 267 For the first time, Smithfield was
faced with the prospect of treating the phosphorus in its discharges, a
requirement which would entail the installation of expensive treatment
technology that had hitherto been unnecessary, since no limit for
phosphorus existed prior to the State developing its water quality
standard.268
"'See id.
'9See id.

2 See id.
261See
262

1d

id.

at 12.

See CH2M HILL, PHOSPHORUS REMOVAL STUDY: SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. 2-1 (1991)
[hereinafter CH2M HILL STUDY].
2 See Policy for Nutrient Enriched Waters, 4:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 1648-49 (1988).
263

5
26
id. at 1649.
2 See
See id.
267]d.

See Petition for Appeal, supra note 239 ("Smithfield will be required to make
substantial modifications in its subsidiaries' treatment plants to comply with these permit
26s

modifications.").
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C. Smithfield's Appeal of the Commonwealth's Water Quality Standards
and the Associated NPDES PermitModification
Smithfield's response to the state's adoption of the definition of
"nutrient enriched waters" and the Nutrient Policy was to challenge these
regulations in state court. 69 This appeal was commenced in June 1988.70
The fundamental premise of Smithfield's challenge of the regulations was
their cost.2 7' The SWCB had determined that compliance with the 2.0
mg/1 limit could be achieved, but the range of costs necessary to achieve
the limit varied widely depending on the type of treatment needed to
comply.272 The Board had estimated the cost of compliance from all
regulated sources to be in the range of $27.5 to $228 million.273 From
Smithfield's perspective, the least expensive treatment alternative,
biological phosphorus removal (BPR), was insufficient to achieve
compliance with the 2.0 mg/1 limit.274 According to Smithfield, "[tihe
evidence in the record shows that BPR: (a) can reliably reduce effluent
phosphorus to a concentration of 4 mg/l on a monthly basis, but (b) cannot
reduce effluent phosphorus concentrations to 2 mg/l on a monthly basis, as
required, without supplementary chemical addition, which substantially
increases compliance costs. 275
In its appeal of the state's water quality standard before the state
court, Smithfield contended that it could not:
achieve compliance through application of the relatively
inexpensive BPR technology. Worse, Smithfield may not
even be able to achieve compliance by installing
supplementary chemical addition.
It is likely that
Smithfield would have to add another very expensive unit
process to the end of its existing wastewater treatment
plants to achieve compliance.276

generally id.
See id.
271
See id. at 2.
272 See id. at 7.
273 See id.
274 See id. at 8.
271 Id.(emphasis in original).
276
Id.at 11.
269 See
270
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The issue, therefore, was not compliance, but the cost of achieving
compliance with the limit.2 "
The principal conclusion drawn by
Smithfield was that "[tihese increased costs [would] place Smithfield at a
competitive disadvantage" with other meatpackers not subject to the
rule.278 To avoid these costs of compliance, Smithfield continued to
pursue its legal challenges to the regulations and the required permit
modification.
In October 1989, while its appeal of the state regulations was
pending, Smithfield initiated a Petition for Formal Hearing before the
Board to challenge the permit modifications required by those regulations,
even though Smithfield's permit had not yet been modified.279 In this
preemptive Petition, Smithfield reiterated its objection to the adopted
regulations, stating its allegation that the regulations were developed with
municipal wastewater treatment plants in mind and that Smithfield's
wastewaters were "fundamentally different" due to their elevated
concentration of phosphorus.2"' Smithfield claimed that requiring the
proposed level of pollutant reduction would result in costs of compliance
for Smithfield "many times greater, on a unit volume basis, than those
imposed on municipal plants. 28' The claim was one of equity. To impose
these effluent limitations would, in Smithfield's opinion, be
"unnecessarily burdensome and unfair" since they were not developed
with Smithfield's wastewater characteristics in mind and would impose
treatment costs incommensurate with those facilities for whom the limit
was developed. 22 However, it is important to remember that water
quality-based effluent limitations, such as those at issue in the Smithfield
challenge, differ from technology-based limitations in that they generally
are not intended to consider the technological feasibility or cost of
compliance, but instead are designed to protect the receiving water from
the adverse effects of pollution.283 They are intended to achieve directly
levels of water quality which are not satisfied by the application of
technology-based standards.284 Furthermore, they are designed to address
277 See
27 8

id. at 12.

Id.at 11.

279

See In re Modification of VPDES, Permit No. VA0059005 (State Water Control

Board
1989).
2
11 See id. at 3.
281 Id. at 4.
282 See id. at 3-4.
283 See CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1994).
284 See id. § 301(b)(1)(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c).

The water quality standards
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existing water quality problems."'
The State Board (SWCB or Board) responded to Smithfield's
Petition in October, 1989, denying the request for a hearing because "no
final action has been taken by the Board regarding the permit, '286 i.e., there
was no basis for an appeal because the state had not taken any action for
which an appeal could be brought. Instead, the Board scheduled an
informal public hearing for December 4, 1989, "to receive comments on
the proposed issuance or denial of the modification of a Virginia Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) Permit 21 7 for Smithfield Foods.
The meeting was held, but no comments were received from the public,
which left Virginia with comments only from the company (in the form of
their appeal and Petition) regarding the permit reissuance.2 8 The SWCB
explicitly acknowledged the history of comment by Smithfield on the
proposed permit, but approved the modification of Smithfield's VPDES
permit, i.e., the Board explicitly approved the inclusion of the 2.0 mg/l
limit as required by the state's Nutrient Policy in spite of the objections
voiced by the company.28 9
On December 11, 1989, the Board reopened and modified
Smithfield's existing VPDES permit to include the 2.0 mg/1 total
phosphorus effluent limit required by the Nutrient Policy.2 0 This
developed by states are based on the desired water quality characteristics of the water
body, as specified by the State in its designated use classification, i.e., the State could
designate the use of the water body as a public water supply, or it could specify the use
of the water body as fishable/swimmable. The designated use is designed to achieve the
national goals for water quality-stated in § 101(a) of the Act. By setting the designated
use, the State determines the stringency of the associated limit derived from the standard,
i.e., the more pristine the designated use, the more restrictive is the limit. Telephone
Interview with Rob Wood, Office of Science and Technology, U.S. EPA (Jan. 22, 1998).
In setting the designated use, the state must take into account a variety of factors,
including whether the standard will result in "substantial and widespread economic and
social impact." 40 CFR § 13 1.10(g). It seems unlikely that Smithfield's challenge of the
state's water quality standard would have prevailed based on economic considerations
alone.
285
See generally CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. 1313 (1994).
286 Letter from Richard N. Burton, Executive Director, State Water Control Board,
Commonwealth of Virginia, to James Ryan, Esq., Mays and Valentine (Oct. 26, 1989).
287 Notice of Public Hearing, State Water Control Board (attached to the Oct. 26, 1989
letter).
288 See Memorandum from the Director of OWRM to the Executive Director of the State
Water
Control Board (Dec. 22, 1989).
289
See id.
2 See id.
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modification became effective on January 4, 1990, and imposed a schedule
for Smithfield to comply with the phosphorus standard. 29' The permit
stipulated that Smithfield was to achieve compliance with the phosphorus

limit within approximately thirty-five months after the permit's
modification, although no definitive compliance date was specified.292

Smithfield responded quickly to this action on two fronts: the first
was to initiate a series of attacks on the standard in the news media, with
an accompanying threat to leave the State to escape the phosphorus
requirement. 293 Specifically, upon learning of the new permit limit for
phosphorus, Joseph Luter, III, president of Smithfield Foods, stated that
the company's operations in Norfolk, Suffolk, and Smithfield, Virginia
could be moved to a 1,000 acre facility which had already been built by
Smithfield in Bladen County, North Carolina if Virginia forced the

company to comply with the phosphorus limit for its wastewater.294 In
January, 1990, Smithfield's vice president, Robert Manly stated "[w]e're
as serious as a heart attack. We're not trying to hold a gun to anybody's
head, but we have to make business decisions." '95 At this time, Manly
stated that the North Carolina facility Smithfield had been building before
the phosphorus limit was proposed was large enough to accommodate its
and it did not have the troublesome phosphorus
Virginia operations,
296
restrictions.
29, See Permit No. VA0059005, State Water Control Board (1989) [hereinafter 1990

VPDES Permit].
29 See id. The permit required Smithfield to achieve compliance with the total
phosphorus limitations by completing the following performance objectives within the
specified timetable: 1) initiate design of facilities within 30 days after the modification
date of the permit; 2) submit plans to the SWCB within 90 days from (1); 3) commence
construction within 30 days of approval of the plans; 4) complete construction within 29
months of (3); and 5) achieve compliance with final effluent limitations 30 days after
completion of construction. See 1990 VPDES Permit, supra note 291. This schedule
does not provide a final date certain for compliance but sets up compliance dates
contingent on previously completed activity. See id.
293 See e.g., Bill Geroux, Bay Plan Touches Southside: Smithfield May Move Plants,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 1990, at 1.
294
See Statement of Undisputed Facts and Memorandum of Law in Support of the United
States' Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Liability and Section 309(g)(6) Issues
at 16, United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. (E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 2:96cv1204) (citing
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Smithfield Inc. PondersMove to Carolina, Dec. 31, 1989)
[hereinafter Statement of Undisputed Facts and Memorandum of Law].
29 Geroux, supra note 293, at 1.
2
See Statement of Facts and Undisputed Memorandum of Law, supra note 294, at 17
(citing to RICHMOND

TIMES-DISPATCH,

Smithfield Inc. Ponders Move to Carolina,Dec.
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, The second front pursued by Smithfield was to resurrect the
company's request for a public hearing. The Board now granted this
request because the actual permit modification created a ripe issue for a
hearing. The date for this hearing, however, was delayed pending the
outcome of negotiations between the state and Smithfield which took the
form of a Consent Special Order29 7 on the administrative proceedings
29
designed "to facilitate an agreed resolution to their dispute.""
Upon a
motion by Smithfield, the state court had entered an order postponing final
argument on Smithfield's June 1988 appeal of the state's water quality
standard pending a formal evidentiary hearing with the Board on the
permit modification.2
The Consent Special Order became the forum
through which the state and Smithfield resolved their differences regarding
the permit modification, thus negating the requirement for a judicial suit or
other public meeting."l
D. The Commonwealth of Virginia'sFirstConsent Special Order-March
21, 1990301
The first Consent Special Order related to the state's water quality
standard for phosphorus became effective on March 21, 1990. 302 It
31, 1989).
See Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, A Special Order Issued to
Smithfield Foods, Incorporated-Smithfield Packing Company and Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. Wastewater Treatment Plants, at 1 (Mar. 21, 1990) [hereinafter Consent
Special Order, March 1990].
" 1d; Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, In re Adoption of State
Water Control Board Regulations (Isle of Wight Co. Cir. Ct. 1990) [hereinafter Adoption
of State Water Control Board Regulations].
2
9See Adoption of State Water Control Board Regulations, supra note 298.
3 See generally Consent Special Order, March 1990, supra note 297. The Consent
Special Orders were publicly noticed and written comments from the public could be
submitted, but there was no right by the public to challenge in court the ultimate decision
of the Orders. See id.
301 Consent Special Order, March 1990, supra note 297. For a summary of the state's
Consent Special Orders in the Smithfield case, see Table 111-1.
32
" See id. at 3. See also Statement of Undisputed Facts and Memorandum of Law, supra
note 294, at vi n.1.
The State Water Control Board had previously issued two special
orders dealing with total Kjeldahl nitrogen limits in the Permit.
Specifically, the May 1986 Permit VA0059005 issued to Smithfield
Foods for Outfalls 001 and 002 imposed stricter total Kjeldahl nitrogen
limits on Smithfield Foods than the prior permits governing these
outfalls. Stating that 'the Board and Smithfield recognize that
29
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accomplished three basic objectives.3 3 First, it clarified the schedule for
compliance with the phosphorus standard outlined in the permit.3" The
permit did not have a certain date by which Smithfield had to comply with
the limit. The Consent Special Order specified January 4, 1993, as the
date by which Smithfield had to comply with the phosphorus standard.30 5
Second, Smithfield agreed to study what technologies were available to
attain compliance with the 2.0 mg/1 phosphorus standard, the associated
costs involved, and any other phosphorus limitations that Smithfield could
reasonably and practicably attain.30 6 Third, the Consent Special Order
introduced the idea of Smithfield studying the feasibility of connecting its
wastewater discharges to the Hampton Roads Sanitation District (HRSD)
sewage treatment system as a means to comply with the phosphorus
limit.3 "7 The purpose for enumerating these two alternative methods of
compliance was to allow Smithfield the opportunity to "compare the costs
of the different treatment options"3 8 and to make a decision on which
alternative they would choose based on which method was the most cost
effective solution for the company.
Smithfield's VPDES permit was due to expire on May 13, 1991,
and they were required by law to submit a permit application for the
reissued permit at least 180 days prior to this date.3" By November 13,
additional water quality data on the Pagan River would be of benefit in
confirming the model prediction' used to set the stricter total Kjeldahl
nitrogen limits, the Board imposed 'interim limits' on nitrogen that
were less strict than those set forth in the Permit. In return, Smithfield

Foods was required to submit water quality data and modelling [sic]
information. Special Order (May 13, 1986).... This special order

was amended by the State Water Control Board on January 25, 1988,
when the State Water Control Board imposed a schedule for the
submission of new data and the construction of treatment equipment to
meet the total Kjeldahl nitrogen standards.

Special Order (Jan. 25,

1988)[].
Id.
303
See Consent Special Order, March 1990, supra note 297, at 1-2.
3
04 See id. at 1.
305

See id. ("Smithfield is further required to attain full compliance with the phosphorus

by January 4, 1993.").
limitation
3
06 See id. at 1-2.
307 See id. at 2
30

8 Id.

See Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, Authorization to
Discharge under the Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and the Virginia
State Water Control Law, at 1, Part III (effective date May 13, 1986) (Management
Requirements) [hereinafter 1986 VPDES Permit].

31
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1990, therefore, -Smithfield was required to submit its application for
permit reissuance and, according to the Consent Special Order, they were
also required to inform the Board of their choice for complying with the
phosphorus standard.310 Smithfield submitted an initial permit application
package which was received by the State on November 11, 1990 and
supplemented this package with further information on December 21,
1990 and January 16, 1991.3" ' A complete permit application was not
received by the State until January 30, 1991.312
Throughout this process, Smithfield retained its right to request a
less stringent phosphorus limit through the mechanism of the formal
hearing (which had been delayed by the adoption of the Consent Special
Order) and the Board agreed to issue a draft permit after the November 13,
1990 application deadline with "an appropriate phosphorus limitation. 31 3
If Smithfield did not accept the proposed effluent limit for phosphorus in
the draft permit and did not choose to hook into the HRSD system, then
the formal hearing on the permit limit would be scheduled. 3 4 At this point
in the process, Smithfield had four options: 1) hook into the HRSD
system; 2) accept the existing phosphorus limit of 2.0 mg/l; 3) continue its
legal challenge to the limit through a formal hearing on the permit or,
further, a judicial appeal of the state's water quality standard (which had
already been initiated in June 1988); or 4) leave the state.31 5 The Consent
Special Order process was designed to avoid these last two alternatives.31 6
In accordance with the requirement of the Consent Special Order,
Smithfield contracted with Wells Engineers Environmental, Inc. (Wells
Engineers) "to assess technologies, costs and reliability in attaining
3'1 7
compliance with the present 2.0 mg/l effluent phosphorus standard."
Wells Engineers canvassed the forty-eight contiguous states to determine
the extent of state-developed phosphorus limitations and to identify
facilities comparable to Smithfield to evaluate the success of such
See id.; Consent Special Order, March 1990, supranote 297, at 2.
3, See Memorandum from Permits Program Manager, OWRM, to Executive Director,
State Water Control Board (Dec. 23, 1991) (on file with the author and the William and
Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review) [hereinafter Memorandum from Permits
Program Manager].
312 see id.
313 See Consent Special Order, March 1990, supra note 297, at 2.
314 See id.
315 See id.
316 See id.
310

3 17

WELLS ENGINEERS ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY, supra note 252, at 1.
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companies in meeting their limitation."' Further, they provided cost
estimates of the various systems used to treat phosphorus in the real-life
examples contained in the report.3" This information was submitted to
Smithfield in October 1990, approximately one month prior to the
deadline for Smithfield to decide its course of action.32
The basic conclusion of the study was that various existing
treatment systems could provide effluent characteristics for phosphorus in
the range of 0.86-0.95 mg/l on a monthly average basis, but that no system
accomplished this removal efficiency consistently.3 2' The facility most
similar to Smithfield in the study had violated its phosphorus limit in three
of the previous twelve months.322 The report concluded that this particular
system could achieve a higher degree of pollutant removal with the
addition of a more extensive phosphorus treatment system, but that even
with this more elaborate system, the expected maximum phosphorus
concentration on a monthly average basis would be 4.5 mg/1.3' The cost
of this more elaborate system for Smithfield's two outfalls was estimated
at $8,690,000 in initial capital expenditure and $1,940,000 in annual
operation and maintenance costs. 324 Wells Engineers did not evaluate the
cost of hooking up to the IRSD system.
E. The Amendment to the March 21, 1990 Consent Special Order 21
On November 6, 1990, through an amendment to the Consent
Special Order, the Board postponed until February 15, 1991, the date by
which Smithfield was required to decide either to hook up to the HRSD
system or construct facilities to comply with the existing VPDES
phosphorus limit.3 26 This delay, which amounted to a three-month
extension, allowed further time for Smithfield to receive cost estimates
from HRSD concerning their potential hook up.
311See id. at
319

320

321

12.

See id. at 93.
See id. at cover.
See id. at 98.

3

72 See

32

id. at 97-98.

3See id. at 97.

324 See

id. at 93.

3' For a summary of the state's Consent Special Orders in the Smithfield case, see Table

III-1.

See Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, State Water Control
Board Enforcement Action: An Amendment to a Special Order Issued to Smithfield
Foods, Inc. (Nov. 6, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Special Order Amendment].
326
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F. The 3Commonwealth
of Virginia's Second Consent Special Order-May
9,1991 27
On May 9, 1991, a new Consent Special Order was entered into by
the State and Smithfield as a result of Smithfield's request for "additional
time to further evaluate biological phosphorus removal technology to
comply with their phosphorus limitation." 28 In this new Order, Smithfield
was given a further time extension until June 15, 1991 to notify the State
of its commitment to connect to the HRSD system or to upgrade its
treatment facilities to comply with the 2.0 mg/l standard.3 29 This second
Order introduced three new elements to the ongoing negotiation process.
First, it set a schedule by which Smithfield would have to hook up to
HRSD if they chose this option. 33 ° This schedule was expressed as "within
three months of its notification by HRSD that a sewer line is available for
the collection of Smithfield's wastewater.1 33 1 Second, it required
Smithfield to petition the State Circuit Court to dismiss, without prejudice,
its pending appeal of the phosphorus standard. Third, it contained the
following clause: "[n]othing herein shall be construed as altering,
modifying, or amending any term or condition contained in VPDES
Permit No. VA0059005. ' ' 332

The evaluation of biological phosphorus removal technology
sought by Smithfield was initiated in the form of a contract with the
consulting firm CH2M Hill.333 Their final report was issued in May
1991. 3 ' The basic purpose of this study was to "determine if biological
nutrient removal (BNR) is a feasible treatment alternative" for the removal
of total phosphorus and "to develop comparative costs of discharge" to
HRSD.335 The study evaluated the following alternatives: 1) the addition
of new chemical treatment facilities at Smithfield followed by the existing
327 For a
321

summary of the state's Consent Special Orders in the Smithfield case, see Table

Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, State Water Control Board

Enforcement Action: A Special Order Issued to Smithfield Foods, Inc. (May 9, 1991)

[hereinafter
Consent Special Order, May 1991].
329
See id.

330 See

id.

331Id.
332 Id.
333

See CH2M HILL STUDY, supra note 263.
id. at 1-1.

131See
335 id.
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biological treatment facilities at the plant, either for directly discharging to
the Pagan River (which would require compliance with the 2.0 mg/i limit)
or for treating the wastes prior to discharging to HRSD; 2) discharging to
HRSD without any additional treatment of the waste stream (which would,
nonetheless, involve capital costs to Smithfield in the form of a new
interceptor sewer, as well as operating and management costs and periodic
surcharge fees from RSD); and 3) the addition of new biological
treatment units, either for direct discharge to the Pagan River or for
treatment prior to discharging to -RSD.336
The study identified several risks associated with Smithfield
continuing to discharge to the Pagan River.337 The basic conclusion of the
report was that Smithfield could comply with the 2.0 mg/I limit within the
time frame established by the permit, assuming proper operation and
maintenance of new wastewater treatment facilities, but such facilities
would require "rigorous process control. 338 Without such process control,
Smithfield faced the prospect of continuing noncompliance and the
associated risk of fines.339 The clear implication of the report is that such
rigorous process control would be attainable in practice but would be
costly to maintain over time, i.e., in terms of personnel and equipment.340
Moreover, if the State developed additional nutrient limits (e.g., for
nitrogen), additional capital and operating and management (O&M) costs
would accrue. 4 ' The report recommended that "the overall most costeffective alternative for Smithfield Foods, when considering both plants
together, is to discharge to LJRSD,"3 42 since this was, by far, the most costeffective solution to the phosphorus dilemma and would transfer
responsibility for wasteload reductions to IRSD.3 43
Smithfield's VPDES permit, meanwhile, was being processed by
the State and was forwarded to the EPA's Region III office on May 21,
1991 in accordance with the MOU. 34 The permit which the EPA
reviewed contained effluent limitations for a variety of pollutant
parameters and the limits were developed using a variety of different
336

See id. at 1-2.

337 See id.
338

See id. at 6-2.
See id.
340 See generally id.
341 See id. at 6-2.
342
Id. at 6-1.
343
See id. at 5-1.
'44 See MOU, supra note 23 1, at 3-8.
339
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sources and methodologies. The limits for total suspended solids (TSS),
oil and grease, and fecal coliform were derived from the federal effluent
guidelines, 3 45 while the limits for carbonaceous biological oxygen demand
(CBOD), pH, total residual chlorine, and ammonia were developed from
water quality standards and/or the best professional judgment of the permit
writer.3 46 For phosphorus, the permit contained the January 4, 1993,
schedule for compliance and monitoring requirements for the period prior
to that date. 347 Beyond the schedule date, the permit required compliance
with the 2.0 mg/1 limit as outlined in the state's Nutrient Policy.34 The
EPA was given thirty days to object to the conditions in the permit or, in
the absence of any comment, the permit would be deemed acceptable to
the EPA and submitted for public notice. 49 The EPA did not object to the
permit, and it was subsequently submitted to Smithfield and the public for
comment.3 "
On June 6, 1991, Smithfield and the state submitted a joint
agreement to the Circuit Court of Isle of Wight County to dismiss
Smithfield's pending appeal of the state's phosphorus water quality
standard. 351 This dismissal was without prejudice and was initiated to
comply with the Consent Special Order issued by the Board on May 9,
1991.352 The dismissal of Smithfield's pending appeal did not affect the
permit issuance process, however, which continued on August 2, 1991,
when the state disseminated a public notice of the proposed permit for
Smithfield.353 This permit was the same as the one forwarded to the EPA,
in that it contained all of the limits derived from the state's Nutrient
Policy.3 54 Smithfield responded that they could not meet the proposed
...
See

40 CFR § 432.22.

See Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, Authorization to
Discharge Under the Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and the Virginia
State Water Control Law (Jan. 3, 1992) [hereinafterl992 VPDES Permit].
347
See id.
348
See id.
349
See MOU, supranote 231, at 6-7.
35 See
Memorandum from Permits Program Manager, supra note 311.
351See Decree, Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, In Re: Adoption of
State Water Control Board Regulations: VR 680-21-07 "Nutrient Enriched Waters" and
VR 680-14-02 "Policy for Nutrient Enriched Waters," (Isle of Wight Co. Cir. Ct. June
1991).
352 See id.;
Consent Special Order, May 1991, supra note 328, at 76.
...
See Letter from Debra L. Thompson, Permit Engineer, State Water Control Board, to
Larry Lively, Director, Environmental Affairs, Smithfield Foods, Inc. (Aug. 2, 1991).
354 See 1992 VPDES Permit, supra note 346.
346
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compliance schedule since they had agreed "to abandon plans to upgrade
355
our existing facilities and tap onto HRSD when it [became] available.
Smithfield objected to the fact that the proposed permit continued to
include the January 4, 1993 compliance date for phosphorus and requested
that "some documentation or letter be provided by the State Water Control
Board stating that alternative compliance will be maintained with
Smithfield's agreement to connect to HRSD as soon as it becomes
available regardless of the time frame in which this occurs."356
The State, through its DEQ, responded to Smithfield's request with
a letter dated October 10, 1991.317 In this letter, the State averred that "any
special order agreements relative to compliance with water quality
standards, the Permit regulation and associated studies that have been
approved by the Board take precedence over the VPDES Permit."358 This
letter, however, also indicated that the "draft permit is a separate document
from the current Consent Special Order issued to Smithfield in May
1991." 359 Furthermore, the letter stated that "[t]he compliance schedules
and related goal dates contained in the permit are there to afford the
permittee necessary time to comply with the established effluent
limitations.,, 3' The letter, therefore, could be interpreted as establishing
the Consent Special Order and the permit as two separate tracks.
Smithfield, however, interpreted this letter to mean that the VPDES Permit
issued by the state was superseded by the Consent Special Orders,3 6' which
allowed Smithfield the opportunity to choose a hook up to HRSD in lieu
362
of installing additional treatment to comply with the phosphorus limit.
It is important to keep in mind that the EPA was neither consulted on, nor
a party to, the preparation of this letter and its interpretation of the effect
355 Letter from Lawrence D. Lively, Director, Environmental Affairs, Smithfield Foods,

Inc. to Ms. Debra Thompson, State Water Control Board (Oct. 1, 1991) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Letter from Lawrence D. Lively to Ms. Debra Thompson]. See also
Memorandum from Permits Program Manager, supra note 311 (stating that Smithfield
had sent the State a letter dated June 7, 1991 to notify the State of its intent to cease
discharge and hook up to HRSD).
36 Letter from Lawrence D. Lively to Ms. Debra Thompson, supra note 355.
357 Letter from Ms. Debra L. Thompson, Environmental Engineer, State Water Control
Board to Larry Lively, Director, Environmental Affairs, Smithfield Foods, Incorporated
(Oct.
10, 1991).
3 58
Id.
359id.

360
Id.
361 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 785 (E.D. Va. 1997).
361 See generally id.
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of the state's Orders on the federal permit requirements. The federal
VPDES permit, however, was issued unmodified after a public comment
period which produced no comments other than those submitted by
Smithfield. 63 The permit's effective date was January 3, 1992, and it
contained the compliance deadline of January 4, 1993, to which Smithfield
had objected, along with the phosphorus limit of 2.0 mg/l established
under the state's water quality standards.364
G. The Entry of the Environmental ProtectionAgency into the Smithfield
Case--QuarterlyEnforcement Meetings Between the DEQ and the EPA
The narrative, thus far, has concentrated on the relationship
between Smithfield and Virginia largely because the EPA's involvement
to this point was limited to its review of the proposed VPDES permit, for
which it had no comment since it contained all the limits and conditions
required by the federal NPDES program.365 This quiescence on the part of
the federal government, however, was about to end.
The Commonwealth of Virginia's Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) and the EPA's Region 1I hold quarterly meetings between
the enforcement staffs of the respective agencies. The purpose of these
meetings is to review the compliance and enforcement activities of the
State and to discuss particular facilities that are reported on the Quarterly
Noncompliance Report (QNCR). The QNCR is a management tool used
by approved NPDES states and the EPA to identify the most serious
violating facilities so that appropriate enforcement action can be taken to
address the situation.366 Smithfield was first reported to the EPA on the
QNCR for the quarter ending June 30, 1994.367 The staff of the EPA's
Region I enforcement office was alerted to Smithfield's status at their
quarterly meeting on August 23, 1994.368 At this time, Smithfield was
listed as being in violation of an interim limit established in the May 9,
363

See 1992 VPDES Permit, supra note 346, at 2.

3

64See id. at3.

161

See Memorandum from Permits Program Manager, supra note 311, at 2.

" See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 778 (E.D. Va. 1997).
367

See generally U.S.

ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, QUARTERLY NONCOMPLIANCE

REPORT-COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Sept. 2, 1994) [hereinafter QUARTERLY
NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT (Sept. 1994)].

See Lorraine H. Reynolds, U.S. EPA-Region III, Handwritten notes from quarterly
enforcement meeting between EPA and the Commonwealth of Virginia (Aug. 23, 1994)
(on file with author).
368
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1991, Consent Special Order for total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), 36 9 not for
violations of the phosphorus limit (or the TKN limit) in their permit.
By the subsequent quarterly meeting on November 29, 1994, the
State indicated to the EPA enforcement staff that Smithfield had returned
to compliance with the interim limits for TKN,370 but Smithfield continued
to appear on the QNCR for September' and December 1994,372 for
violations of the state's Consent Special Order.
73
H. The Amendment to the May 9, 1991 ConsentSpecial Order

At around this time, Smithfield and the State negotiated another
amendment of the May 9, 1991, Consent Special Order-this one effective
on November 8, 1994.3' This order explicitly allowed Smithfield to
comply with the VPDES permit limits for CBOD, total cyanide, and
ammonia by connecting to the HRSD system.375 Furthermore, the order
held "in abeyance 376 the effluent limits for those pollutant parameters.
Therefore, the state, using its prosecutorial discretion, determined that the
best environmental remedy for Smithfield to pursue was to hook up to the
HRSD system, even though Smithfield violated its NPDES permit limits
for ammonia in thirteen separate months and violated its permit limits for
cyanide in four separate months.3 "
By the February 15, 1995, quarterly enforcement meeting, the EPA
staff were notified that Smithfield had experienced two months of TSS
violations greater than forty percent of their limit.37 These violations were
3

69 See QUARTERLY NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT (Sept. 1994), supra note 367.
. oSee Reynolds, supra note 368 (Aug. 23, 1994).
7

371See U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, QUARTERLY NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT-

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Dec. 4, 1994) [hereinafter QUARTERLY NONCOMPLIANCE

REPORT (Dec. 1994)].
372

See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, QUARTERLY NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT-

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Mar. 6,
1995) [hereinafter QUARTERLY
NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT (Mar. 1995)].
3 For a summary of the state's Consent Special Orders in the Smithfield case, see Table

III-l.
4Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, An Amendment to a Special
Order Issued to Smithfield Foods, Inc. (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Special Order
Amendment].
375
See id.
376 Id.

377 See id.
371 See Lorraine H. Reynolds, U.S. EPA-Region III, Handwritten notes from quarterly
enforcement meeting between EPA and the Commonwealth of Virginia (Feb. 15, 1995)
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added to the TKN violations on the QNCR, but their status was
subsequently reported to the EPA as "resolved pending," 379 i.e., their
compliance status was resolved pending the completion of the state's
administrative enforcement actions. In addition to these violations, at this
enforcement meeting the EPA learned of "huge fecal and solids
violations"38 ° at Smithfield and fecal coliform contamination in the Pagan
River, although it was unclear at the time if these fecal coliform levels
were caused by Smithfield or some other source of pollution.381
In February 1995, at the SWCB meeting, the state DEQ planned to
recommend an enforcement action against Smithfield. 382 This action,
however, ultimately was not approved by management within the DEQ.383
Soon thereafter, in the spring of 1995, a compliance auditor with the state
DEQ contacted the EPA's Region III office requesting that the federal
government become involved in the Smithfield case because the state was
reluctant to act.3" This unsolicited contact from a staff person at the state
DEQ alerted the EPA to violations at the Smithfield facility other than
those officially reported on the QNCR and was a factor in the EPA's
decision to pursue civil judicial enforcement against Smithfield.38 5 The
EPA's initial response upon learning of the noncompliance by Smithfield
was to defer to the state DEQ. 386 The DEQ, however, chose not to initiate
timely and appropriate enforcement action; eventual connection to the
local sewage treatment plant was sufficient to satisfy the state in this
38 7
matter.

(on file with the author).
179

See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, QUARTERLY NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT -

COMMONWEALTH

OF

VIRGINIA

(Sept.

1,

1995)

[hereinafter

QUARTERLY

NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT (Sept. 1995)]. All facilities listed on the QNCR which are
under current enforcement orders (e.g., administrative and judicial orders or consent
decrees) must continue to be listed on the QNCR until those orders have been satisfied in
full and the facility is in compliance with its permit. If the facility is in compliance with
the enforcement order, but has not achieved full compliance with its permit, then its
compliance
must be listed as "resolved pending." See 40 CFR § 123.45(a)(2)(B).
380 Reynolds,status
supra note 378 (Feb. 15, 1995).
381
382

See id.
Interview with Lorraine Reynolds, U.S. EPA-Region III (March 30, 1998) (on file

with the author).
383

3

14

See id.
See id.

385 See id.
386
387

See id.
See id.
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TABLE IHI-I

Summary of Smithfield's NPDES Permit and Consent Special Order (CSO) Conditions
Date

Document

Conditions

March 21, 1990

1st CSO

1) Allowed Smithfield to study the costs of
compliance with the phosphorus standard.
2) Allowed Smithfield to study the feasibility of
connecting to HRSD.
3) Required Smithfield to notify the Board by
November 13, 1990 of its compliance decision.

November
1990

Amendment
to 1st CSO

1) Allowed Smithfield to continue its study of
connecting to HRSD.
2) Required Smithfield to notify the Board by
February 15, 1991 of its compliance decision.

2nd CSO

1) Set interim limits (different than the permit
limits) for TKN.
2) Allowed Smithfield further time to evaluate
options.
3) Required Smithfield to notify the Board of its
compliance decision by June 15, 1991.
4) Required Smithfield to connect to HRSD within
3 months of availability if this option is chosen.
5) Required Smithfield to submit a schedule to
comply with the phosphorus standard if HRSD
option is not taken.
6) Required Smithfield to dismiss its appeal of the
phosphorus standard.

Letter from
DEQ

1) Declares that any special order agreements
relative to compliance with water quality
standards, the Permit regulation and associated
studies that have been approved by the Board
take precedence over the VPDES Permit."
2) States that the draft permit is a separate
document from the current Consent Special
Order."

NPDES
Permit

Pollutant Parameters:
Phosphorus, Ammonia, BOD, TKN, CBOD, Fecal
Coliform, Oil and Grease, Cyanide, Total Suspended

6,

May 9, 1991

October
1991

10,

January 3, 1992
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Summary of Smithfield's NPDES Permit and Consent Special Order (CSO) Conditions
Solids.
Compliance Dates:
Phosphorus ...............................January 4, 1993
Ammonia, CBOD, Cyanide ........... May 13, 1994
BOD, TKN, Fecal Coliform,
Oil and Grease, and Total
Suspended Solids ....................... January 4, 1992
November
1994

8,

Amendment
to 2nd CSO

1) Held in abeyance the NPDES permit effluent
limits for CBOD, ammonia, and cyanide.

During the May 31, 1995, enforcement meeting, the company was
listed as being in compliance for the entire previous quarter,3"' but by the
September 13, 1995, enforcement meeting, the EPA indicated to the state
its interest in seeing civil penalties assessed against Smithfield for its
history of violations. 389 At this time, however, a criminal investigation of
the company was being conducted by the United States with the
cooperation and assistance of the state.390 This proceeding ultimately led
to the criminal conviction of an employee of Smithfield for report
falsification and records destruction. 39 ' As a result of this criminal
investigation, the United States and the Virginia DEQ agreed that no civil
enforcement against Smithfield would be initiated during the early stages
of the criminal investigation.392 In February 1996, however, the United
States notified the DEQ that no further delay in pursuing civil enforcement
was necessary.393
Smithfield was not on the agenda for the November 1995, the
February 1996, or the June 1996 enforcement meetings, nor was it

3 See Lorraine H. Reynolds, U.S. EPA-Region III, Handwritten notes from quarterly
enforcement meeting between EPA and the Commonwealth of Virginia (May 31, 1995)
(on file with the author).
9 See Lorraine H. Reynolds, U.S. EPA-Region III, Handwritten notes from quarterly
enforcement meeting between EPA and the Commonwealth of Virginia (Sept. 13, 1995)
(on file with the author).
3
90 See id.
39 See generally United States v. Terry L. Rettig, No. 2:96 CR 00179-001 (E.D. Va.
1997).
392
See Reynolds, supra note 389 (Sept. 13, 1995).
393
See Statement of Undisputed Facts and Memorandum of Law, supra note 294, at x.
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discussed at these times, s94 even though Smithfield remained on the QNCR
without any variation in its status from March 1995 through September
1996. 39s On April 8, 1996, however, the DEQ sent a letter to Smithfield
identifying a series of violations of the facility's VPDES permit for BOD,
TSS, pH, oil and grease, and fecal coliform, and alleging violations of the
96
interim limits for TKN contained in the state's Consent Special Order.
This letter was the culmination of a series of Notices of Violation (NOV)
issued by the DEQ beginning in September 1994, s97 soon after the facility
was first identified on the QNCR and, thus, raised to the attention of EPA
management.398 The NOV is an informal enforcement response which
simply enumerates the violation but does nothing further to compel
compliance, i.e., it is not independently enforceable and creates no
obligations of its own on the company. 399 Therefore, such actions do not
rise to the level of "formal" enforcement as defined by the EPA in its
Policy Framework' and would not satisfy the criteria of timely and
appropriate action." The State had issued nine such NOVs to Smithfield
prior to the letter from the DEQ.
The letter stated that "[b]ecause of
these ongoing alleged violations, we intend to recommend to the State
Water Control Board at its May 22, 1996 meeting that the Board consider
requesting the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief and civil penalties
against Smithfield Foods. 40 3
At this meeting, Smithfield's counsel addressed the Board, and the
Board's subsequent instruction to the DEQ was not to take any
enforcement action against Smithfield until the DEQ had met with the
391 See Agendafor QuarterlyEnforcement Meeting (Nov. 29, 1995), (Feb. 20, 1996), and
(June 7, 1996) (on file with the author).
391 See, e.g., QNCRs from Mar. 6, 1995; Sept. 1, 1995; Dec. 15, 1995; Mar. 7, 1996; June
3, 1996; and Sept. 4, 1996 (on file with the author).

" See Letter from Francis L. Daniel, Commonwealth of Virginia, DEQ, to Carl Wood,
Vice President of Engineering, Smithfield Foods, Inc. (Apr. 8, 1996) (on file with the

author).
397 See id.
311 See QUARTERLY NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT (Sept. 1994), supranote 367.
3

99 A Notice of Violation is a term of art used in the EPA's enforcement program. NOVs
can take on a wide variety of forms; they can be phone calls, letters, or any other
communication where a person is put on notice of a violation.
400 See NATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR OVERSIGHT OF NPDES PROGRAMS, supra note 208 and
accompanying text.
401 See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
402 See Letter from Francis L. Daniel to Carl Wood, supra note 396, at 1.
403
Id. at 2.
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company and then reported back to the Board.4 ' This meeting between
the DEQ and Smithfield took place on June 10, and a follow-up Board
meeting occurred on June 11, 1996.405 At the June 11 Board meeting,
counsel for Smithfield indicated that the company "had spent considerable
money attempting to comply with the Board's permit requirements over
the years and that all they were seeking was a little flexibility on the part
of HRSD and DEQ."4 6 The counsel for the company indicated that they
would hook up to the HRSD system "as soon as possible" but that the June
25, 1996 deadline40 7 "might be exceeded by 1-2 weeks."4 " The Board
recommended at the end of this meeting to "release [DEQ] staff to pursue
full enforcement of the 1991 Consent Special Order with Smithfield
Foods, if circumstances require enforcement actions by the
Commonwealth of Virginia, including possible referral to the Attorney
General's Office."
But no enforcement action was approved for the
violations identified in the April 1996 letter.
I. The EPA 's Civil JudicialReferral to the Department of Justice and the
Proposed Civil JudicialAction by the Commonwealth of Virginia
At the August 23, 1996, quarterly enforcement meeting, the EPA
indicated to the State that it had referred its civil enforcement case to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for filing.43 The state's initial reaction was
to question why such a referral was prepared and sent to DOJ without
notification to the state.411 This query was even more urgent, from the
state's perspective, given the fact that the State claimed it was preparing to
"diligently prosecute this case to resolve all the actionable violations at

" See E-mail from Amy Clark, Commonwealth of Virginia, DEQ, to Leonard Nash,
U.S. EPA-Region Ill. (May 31, 1996) (on file with the author).
40sSee Commonwealth of Virginia, DEQ, Minutes: State Water ControlBoard: June 11,
1996, at 1 (June 11, 1996).
06 Id.
7
"0
See id. The HRSD system became available three months prior to this date, on March
25, 1996, and, according to the state's Consent Special Order, the deadline for hook up
was
three months following notification that the system was available.
4
11 Id. at 1.
4
09 Id. at2.
410 See Letter from Thomas L. Hopkins, Director, Commonwealth of Virginia, DEQ, to
W. Michael McCabe, Administrator, U.S. EPA-Region III, at 2 (Sept. 4, 1996) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas L. Hopkins to W. Michael McCabe].
41 See id. at 3.

4
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Smithfield Foods."4 2 The question, from the EPA's perspective, was what
did the state consider to be diligent prosecution and what was "actionable"
under the state case. The tension between the EPA and Virginia was
manifest on two fronts. First, the nature of the cases and the violations
envisioned by the two sovereigns were radically different. The EPA's
case rested on a foundation of effluent violations, with the preponderance
of violations involving the permit's phosphorus limit.4 13 In the fifty
months between January 1993 and March 1997, the EPA alleged that
Smithfield violated its phosphorus permit limit in forty-six of those
months.414 The state, when confronted with these alleged continuous
violations, claimed that "throughout this period, the phosphorus discharges
were fully in compliance with a Virginia enforcement Order."4"5
Furthermore, the violations of TKN alleged in the EPA's referral were
similarly identified by the State as being "in full compliance with the
Order,"4" except for "one of the average and two of the maximum
violations cited."'"7 It is important to remember, however, that the state
had not provided any opportunity for public participation on the terms of
the Consent Special Orders, as is required for a permit modification.4 8
Nor had the EPA been given an opportunity to comment on the terms of
the Consent Special Orders. 419 Furthermore, the state did not attempt to
revise the actual terms of Smithfield's NPDES permit, which therefore
remained in effect and enforceable by the federal government.420
The proposed State case relied on allegations of violation for fecal
coliform, pH, TSS, BOD, oil and grease, and TKN.42 ' These violations
were also cited by the EPA in their action, but the frequency of the
violations cited in the state's case paled in comparison to the allegations of
412

Id. at 3-4

411See U. S. Departinent of Justice, Summary of Exceedences of Discharge Limitations

Contained in Permit VA0059005. (P1. Exh. 5) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Summary of Exceedences of Discharge Limitations].
414 See id.
415 Letter from Thomas L. Hopkins to W. Michael McCabe, supra note 410, at 2.
416 Id.
417

Id.
411See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 778 (E.D. Va. 1997).

See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.62 (1998).
419 See Smithfield Foods Inc., 965 F. Supp. at 778.
420 See id. at 778-79, 787-88.
411See Bill of Complaint, Thomas L. Hopkins v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., (Cir. Court, Isle
of Wight County) (No. 96-125) [hereinafter Bill of Complaint].
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phosphorus violations in the EPA's case.422 Furthermore, the EPA's case
included a variety of permit violations that were never considered for
prosecution by the state.'
The EPA's case, while resting on the
foundation of the phosphorus violations, also alleged (and ultimately
proved) violations of reporting requirements, including late reporting,
false reporting, and records destruction by the company. 424 Smithfield
stipulated that it submitted false Discharge Monitoring Reports on fifteen
occasions, and they did not dispute that they submitted various reports
late. 425 Furthermore, in July, 1994, the chief operator of Smithfield's
wastewater treatment plants, witnessed by two other Smithfield
employees, dumped Smithfield's pre-1994 laboratory analysis records and
bench sheets into a dumpster.426 The court found that such violations were
' since the CWA
serious because of their effect to "undermine the Act"427
relies on self-reporting by the permittee for program oversight.4 28
As the State indicated, however, the existence of the Consent
Special Orders precluded the State from pursuing violations of the
phosphorus, cyanide, ammonia, and most of the TKN violations alleged by
the United States. 429 As a result, the State was left with a small percentage
of the violations alleged by the federal government.430 Taken as a whole,
the state's proposed case excluded almost ninety-five percent of the days
of violation alleged in the United State's case against Smithfield Foods.43
In the opinion of the State, the fact that the United States pursued
violations of the Permit which were in full compliance with the State's
enforcement Order struck "a grievous blow to EPA's credibility and to
federal-state cooperation in environmental enforcement. '43 2 From the
State's perspective, the EPA's action undermined its use of such Orders.433
See Summary of Exceedences of Discharge Limitations, supra note 413.
3See id.
424 See Brief for Appellee United States of America at 10, United States v. Smithfield
4

Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 97-2709) [hereinafter Brief for
Appellee].
425 See id.
426
See id.
427 United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 348 (E.D. Va. 1997).
42
See 33 U.S.C. § 1318a (1994).
429
See Letter from Thomas L. Hopkins to W. Michael McCabe, supra note 410, at 2.
430
See id.
431See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 342 (E.D. Va. 1997).
See
generally Bill of Complaint, supra note 421.
432 Letter
from Thomas L. Hopkins to W. Michael McCabe, supra note 410, at 3.
43 See id.
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According to Virginia, "[i]f DEQ cannot issue enforcement Orders with
the understanding that compliance with the Order will protect the owner
from further enforcement action, then DEQ cannot, in good faith, issue the
Orders at all, even though they are our most effective enforcement
, 434
tools.
The issue of protecting owners of violating facilities from
enforcement by other parties, including the federal government, is at the
heart of the second tension between Virginia and the EPA.435 One of the
state's principal objections to the EPA's referral of its action was the
secrecy in which it was prepared. 436 According to the State, "[n]ot only
did EPA fail to disclose this referral to DEQ, the lead enforcement agency
on the case, EPA actively concealed the pendency of the Referral from
'
DEQ."437
To understand why the referral was prepared without the
consultation of the state, however, it is important to recognize the
perception of the EPA's Region II office with regard to Virginia's
enforcement philosophy.
From the perspective of the EPA, the
Commonwealth of Virginia had
a history of initiating enforcement once EPA informs the
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) of
its intentions to pursue federal action.... In each case, the
actions taken by the Commonwealth and the penalties
collected were much less than EPA believes were
appropriate. Moreover, in each action the Commonwealth
made it clear that its motive in pursuing the actions was to
forestall federal enforcement.438
The three enforcement actions cited by the EPA in this context were
referred to as their "dead referral collection,"439 i.e., cases which have been
mooted as a result of a race-to-the-courthouse with the State that the EPA
4

3

Id.

435 See id.

id.
417 Letter from Thomas L. Hopkins to W. Michael McCabe, supra note 410, at 3.
436 See

438

Letter from W. Michael McCabe, Administrator, U.S. EPA Region III to Thomas L.

Hopkins, Director, Commonwealth of Virginia, DEQ, at 1 (Sept. 19, 1996) (on file with

the author) [hereinafter Letter from W. Michael McCabe to Thomas L. Hopkins].
4" Lorraine H. Reynolds, U.S. EPA-Region III, Handwritten notes from quarterly
enforcement meeting between EPA and the Commonwealth of Virginia (Aug. 23, 1996)
(on file with the author).

.- 1999]

-SMITHFIELD FOODS:

A CASE FOR FEDERAL ACTION

lost."4 -The EPA's contention was that the State had not indicated at any
of the quarterly enforcement meetings any intention of pursuing an action
to recover civil penalties against Smithfield."'
On August 27, 1996, four days after the regularly scheduled
quarterly enforcement meeting between the State and the EPA (where the
State learned, for the first time, of EPA's referral to DOJ), both parties
engaged in a telephone call to discuss the pending EPA referral." 2 During
this call, the EPA invited the state to join the federal case as a co-plaintiff,
and the EPA faxed a copy of the table of violations being alleged in the
federal case." 3 The state declined to join the federal case.'" Furthermore,
the state filed its own Bill of Complaint against Smithfield, dated August
30, 1996, alleging the violations previously cited." 5 This action prompted
the EPA to conclude that the State "responded as it has in the past, i.e., as
soon as DEQ was informed that EPA intended to initiate enforcement
measures, a quick action was taken by the Commonwealth in an attempt to
block the federal process." 46 This conclusion is supported by an internal
audit conducted by a joint commission of the Virginia General
Assembly." 7 This internal audit described the state's relationship with the
federal government with regard to the Smithfield case." 8 Specifically, it
described how the Attorney General's Office filed suit against Smithfield
as soon as it was notified of the EPA's intent to file its own suit." 9 When
the state Board questioned the DEQ about why the referral did not follow
customary channels, the response was terse and to the point--"to beat the
feds. ,, 50
This chronology of events provides the framework to understand
the interaction between the EPA and the Commonwealth of Virginia and
the EPA's ultimate decision to intervene in this particular case. It is to this
specific rationale that the discussion now turns.
440

See id.
Letter from W. Michael McCabe to Thomas C. Hopkins, supra note 438, at 2.
442
See id.
443 See id.
44'See

4

44'
4

See id.
See Bill of Complaint, supra note 421.
Letter from W. Michael McCabe to Thomas C. Hopkins, supra note 438, at 2-3.

447 See JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL

ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

44, at 125 (1996).
448 See id.
449 See id.
4

10Id. at

125.

H. Doc. No.
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IV. THE UNITED STATES V. SMITHFIELD FOODS-A RATIONALE

The policies developed by the EPA serve a critical public policy
function. They advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the
agency proposes to exercise some discretionary power granted by a
statute.45 The EPA's enforcement authority is discretionary,' especially
as it relates to violations occurring in states approved to administer the
NPDES program.4" 3 As a discretionary power, therefore, the EPA's
enforcement strategy in approved states is appropriately prescribed by
policy.454 The EPA's rationale for initiating its civil judicial enforcement
action against Smithfield Foods was based on the agency's policy for
taking direct enforcement action in approved NPDES states, i.e., the action
was based on the direction given in the Policy Framework.455 The
implications of the action, however, extend well beyond the Agency's
policy into the heart of the federalist character of our government's
structure.
A. Elements of the EPA 's Enforcement Rationale in the Smithfield Case
1. Timely andAppropriateEnforcement
The most critical determinant of whether the EPA will initiate
direct enforcement action in a state approved to implement the federal
NPDES permit program is whether the state has or will take "timely and
"' See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS,

supra note

96, at 1.
...
The EPA has always taken the position that its enforcement authority under section
309 is discretionary.

Telephone Interview with Richard Witt, U.S. EPA, Office of

General Counsel, Jan. 22, 1998. For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see, e.g.,
William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation:The CongressionalPrescriptionfor
Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202
(1987).
" See Ringbolt Farms Homeowners Assoc. v. Town of Hull, 714 F. Supp. 1246, 1252
(D. Mass. 1989) ("A review of the statute and the legislative history behind it indicates
that Congress did not contemplate any remedy under the statute against the states for
failure to enforce the provisions of the FWPCA other than the denial or withdrawal of
approval.").
4-4

See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note

96.
411 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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appropriate ' 4 6 enforcement for violations meeting the definition of
SNC.45 7 This determination is the threshold the EPA must satisfy when it
considers initiating a direct enforcement action in an approved state. a 8 In
the case of Smithfield Foods, Virginia's enforcement action against the
facility was neither timely nor appropriate.4 9
a. Timeliness
On June 7, 1991, Smithfield chose to pursue its hook-up to the
HRSD system as the means to comply with the state's Consent Special
Order.4'
The facility's permit compliance date for phosphorus was
January 4, 1993.461 As a result of its choice to use HRSD as the means to
dispose of their wastes, Smithfield "ceased all attempts to comply with the
46
phosphorus limits by upgrading its treatment facilities.""
It is not
surprising, then, that Smithfield violated its permit effluent limit for
phosphorus continuously from January 1993 through its eventual hook up
to HRSD.46 3 In addition to these violations, Smithfield did not comply
with various other pollutant parameters established by its permit,
including: total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), ammonia, fecal coliform, pH,
total suspended solids (TSS), cyanide, and oil and grease. 4' Table IV-1
provides a visual representation of the effluent limit violations alleged by
the United States in its action against Smithfield.4 6' The table is arrayed
chronologically with various columns reserved for particular permit
effluent limit parameters.

46

1

Id. at 22.
id. at 21-22.

417 See
4S

See id. at 21-25.

451See Letter from W.
41 See United States

Michael McCabe to Thomas C. Hopkins, supra note 438.
v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 775-76 (E.D. Va.

1997).

461

See id. at 776.

462 See

id.

See Summary of Exceedences of Discharge Limitations, supranote 413.
464 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 783.
465 See Summary of Exceedences of Discharge Limitations, supranote 413.
463
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TABLE IV-1

Summary of Smithfield Foods Effluent Limit Violations
Date

Permit Effluent Limit Parameter

5/92

TKN

7/92

TKN

3/92

TKN

10/92

TKN

11/92

TKN

12/92

TKN

1/93

Phosphorus

?J93

Phosphorus

3/93

Phosphorus

1/93

Phosphorus

5/93

Phosphorus

5/93

Phosphorus

7/93

Phosphorus

3/93

Phosphorus

)/93

Phosphorus

10/93

Phosphorus

[1/93

Phosphorus

12/93

Phosphorus

1/94

Phosphorus

TKN

?,/94

Phosphorus

TKN

3/94

Phosphorus

4/94

Phosphorus

5/94

Phosphorus

5/94

Phosphorus

TKN

TKN

TKN

TKN

Ammonia

[Vol. 23:381

1999]

SMITHFIELD FOODS: A CASE FOR FEDERAL ACTION

Summary of Smithfield.Foods Effluent Limit Violations.
7/94

Phosphorus

Ammonia

8/94

Phosphorus

Ammonia Fecal Coliform pH

9/94

Phosphorus

Ammonia Fecal Coliform pH TSS

10/94

Phosphorus

Fecal Coliform pH TSS

11/94

hosphorus

Ammonia Fecal Coliform

12/94

hosphorus

Ammonia

1/95

Phosphorus

2/95

hosphorus

3/95

hosphorus

Ammonia

4/95

Phosphorus

Ammonia

5/95

Phosphorus

6/95

Phosphorus

Ammonia

7/95

Phosphorus

Ammonia

8/95

Phosphorus

Ammonia Fecal Coliform

9/95

hosphorus

10/95

hosphorus

11/95

hosphorus

12/95

Phosphorus

1/96

Phosphorus

2/96

Phosphorus

/96

Phosphorus

4/96

Phosphorus

5/96

Phosphorus

6/96
7/96
8/96

Ammonia Fecal Coliform

Ammonia

Cyanide Oil & Grease
pH
Cyanide
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Summary of Smithfield Foods Effluent Limit Violations
9/96

Phosphorus

10/96

Phosphorus

11/96

Phosphorus

Cyanide

12/96

1Phosphorus

Cyanide

The state's Consent Special Orders addressed various of these pollutant
parameters, including: phosphorus, ammonia, TKN, and cyanide; but as a
matter of law, the permit governed the discharge of these parameters even
in the face of conflicting direction from the state's orders.466 The Consent
Special Orders purported to hold "in abeyance" the limits for cyanide and
ammonia64 7 during the pendency of the Orders and established interim
effluent limits for TKN."6 8 The effect of the Orders on phosphorus is
ambiguous,469 but their practical effect was to place all of these pollutants
under a protective umbrella while Smithfield was working toward its
connection to IRSD. 7 °
The administrative enforcement actions taken by Virginia were not
timely for two reasons: 1) they did not address all the effluent limit
violations which rose to the level of SNC (e.g., fecal coliform) and 2) the
Orders, at least as to phosphorus, pre-date the violations and allow them to
occur. 47' The only violations reported to the EPA on the QNCR were for
TKN and TSS. 72 The underlying violations for phosphorus and ammonia
were never reported to the EPA on the QNCR and, from the EPA's
perspective, there was never any formal enforcement action addressing
these violations.473 In addition, the Orders were not responsive to the
See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 784-88.
See 1994 Special Order Amendment, supra note 374; supra notes 374-376 and
accompanying text.
468 See supra notes 374-379 and accompanying text.
469 The positions taken by the state with regard to the phosphorus limitation applicable to
Smithfield appears to be contradictory in that the state indicates that the permit
conditions continue to apply but that the Consent Special Orders supersede the permit
conditions.
171 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 769.
471 See id. at 778-79.
472
For a discussion of QNCRs, see supra notes 3 65-409 and accompanying text.
47
1 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 778.
466
467
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actual violations for phosphorus.474 They anticipated proactively these
violations and allowed the .permit to be violated while the interceptor
sewer was constructed to carry Smithfield's wastes to HRSD.4 75
Virginia's administrative actions against Smithfield were taken prior to the
company being in violation for the pollutant parameters covered by the
Orders which allowed the facility to elude the established mechanism for
reporting and tracking significant violators. 476 Furthermore, by September
1994, Smithfield was in SNC for ammonia. 477 This occurred just two
months prior to the effective date of the amended Consent Special Order
which held the ammonia limit in abeyance. 47 8 But for the existence of this
amendment, the state would have been required to report the facility on the
QNCR479 for this pollutant parameter.
For these reasons, the
administrative enforcement actions taken by the State in response to
Smithfield's permit violations were not timely. Once the State action was
determined not to be timely, it was necessary to evaluate if the state's
action was "moving expeditiously to resolve the violation in an
'appropriate' manner.""48
b. Appropriateness
The appropriateness of a state enforcement action should be
viewed from three different perspectives. The action taken by the
approved state should be evaluated to determine if: 1) the remedy sought
is sufficient to correct the violation; 2) compliance schedules are not
unacceptably extended; and 3) there is an appropriate penalty or other
" ' In the case of Smithfield, the nature of the remedy sought by
sanction.48
the state and the use of compliance schedules are inextricably interwoven
and must be considered simultaneously.
The stated objective of the Commonwealth of Virginia in pursuing
414
475

See id. at 784.
See id.

See id. at 778.
Summary of Exceedences of Discharge Limitations, supranote 413, at 7.
478
See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774.
411 In fact, the state was required to report the facility for ammonia, even given the
existence of the Consent Special Order, but they did not do so as required by federal
regulation. See 40 CFR § 123.45 (1998).
411 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 96, at
22.

476

471 See

481

See id. at 23.
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its administrative remedy against Smithfield was "to secure compliance
with the state water quality standards. 482 The purpose of the Consent
Special Orders, therefore, was to achieve the larger environmental
objective of compliance with national water quality goals, as implemented
through the state's water quality standards. However, as implemented, the
Orders did not address the environmental harm being created by
Smithfield's discharges or the economic benefit accrued by the company
as a result of their noncompliance.483 This approach to enforcement
represents a compliance assistance-based enforcement strategy as the sole
enforcement philosophy.484 In fact, the Commonwealth of Virginia's
actions with respect to Smithfield are quintessential examples of such a
non-confrontational approach to environmental enforcement even when
the circumstances call for more stringent action.485
Virginia in recent years has been an unusually strong proponent of
working with companies to achieve environmental results through a
compliance-based environmental enforcement scheme.486 The state's
position on these issues was stated clearly by Becky Norton Dunlop, the
Secretary of Natural Resources for the Commonwealth of Virginia under
Governor Allen:
Virginia's legislature and Virginia's Governor have, in
many important ways, established that policies which focus
on compliance with environmental laws are better for the
natural resources than policies which focus on enforcement.
Virginia has demonstrated leadership in putting the proper
emphasis on the purpose, goals and objectives of
environmental policy, which, of course, is to improve the
quality and condition of the air, water, soil, flora and fauna
resources which make up the environment.487
This stated attitude, however, is at odds with the facts in the Smithfield

482

Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of Richard Burton), at 490:3, United States of

America v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (1997).
411See discussion infra notes 481-523 and accompanying text.
484 See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1567 and accompanying text.
48sSee supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
486 See Dunlop Statement, supra note 113.
487

id.
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case.488 Smithfield had the ability to comply with the state's 2.0 mg/l
water quality standard for phosphorus within the time frame outlined in its
permit (January 4, 1993).489 The only thing that would have been required
was a financial commitment on the part of the company and "proper
design and operation of treatment facilities.""49 Therefore, Smithfield was
allowed to continue its discharges in violation of the state's water quality
standards for the sole reason that it was economically more advantageous
for them to do so.
This situation is at odds with Virginia's claim that they are
"compliance enthusiasts"4'9 and supports the opposing claim that "[t]he
state government has a predisposition to work with industries to solve
problems rather than to lose the economic base that would result from
shutting them down."4' 9 This sentiment was succinctly stated by former
Governor Allen in the following remarks: "I guess what they would prefer,
these people who are carping and whining, is we just shut down these
businesses, run them out of the state, and all the people who work for them
lose their job."4' 93 If the goal of the state had truly been environmental
improvement, the state should have pursued both short-term and long-term
benefits by requiring initial treatment to comply with the permit effluent
limit and then pursuing the option of the hook up to HRSD. Furthermore,
if the issue for Smithfield had truly been the cost of compliance, why did
Joseph W. Luter, chairman and chief executive officer of Smithfield,
describe the $12.6 million penalty levied against the company in the
following terms: "[b]ottom line is, I view it as a bump in the road that isn't
going to have a substantial effect on our company."49' 4
488

The cost of

See generally United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va.

1997).
See id. at 784 (Smithfield claimed they could not afford the HRSD connection and the

489

phosphorous compliance).
490 CH2M HILL STUDY, supra note 263, at 6-1.
491Scott Harper

and David M. Poole, EPA Letter Says State Lax on Enforcement; DEQ
Retorts That State is Doing Its Job; It's the EPA That is at Fault,THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Oct. 2, 1996, at Al. The deputy director of the DEQ, T. March Bell commented that
"We have a successful record on enforcement because we stress compliance. We're
compliance enthusiasts. We see enforcement as a tool to improve the environment, not
to put a trophy on the wall." Id.
492 Allison T. Williams, HRSD to Treat Wastewater for Smithfield by End of '96, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT,

Nov. 1, 1995, Isle of Wight Citizen, at 4 (comments by Patti Jackson,

executive director of the James River Foundation).
411Wishy-Washy on Water Pollution,THE WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1996, Editorial, at A26.
414 Akweli Parker, A Bump in the Road The Company's Optimism, Like its Stock, Hasn't
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compliance for Smithfield would have been significantly less than this
penalty amount, so the question arises-why did Smithfield resist its
obligation to comply, since the cost of such compliance could not have
been more than a "bump in the road"?
The state, through negotiations of the Consent Special Orders with
the company, presented two compliance options to Smithfield: connection
to public service through the HRSD, or upgrading the treatment facilities
at Smithfield's plants to comply with the state's water quality standard for
phosphorus outlined in the permit.4 9 The choice of which option to be
496
selected, not inappropriately, was left "at the company's discretion."
The most cost-effective solution for Smithfield, as detailed in their
consultant's report to the company, was to hook into the HRSD system. 0
498
Not surprisingly, this was the option ultimately chosen by the company.
However, since the construction necessary for Smithfield to avail itself of
its chosen option took several years, 499 the effect of the orders (in addition
to providing the company economic relief) was to extend, for an
indeterminate period of time, the permit's compliance date for phosphorus.
The principle at issue here is not necessarily the chosen option for
compliance, but the fact that this option allowed Smithfield to continue to
violate its permit conditions with impunity for a period of at least four
years.
The Consent Special Order which enabled Smithfield to choose
between compliance with their permit limits and a hook up to the HRSD
stated that the deadline for hook up would be "within three months of its
notification by HRSD that a sewer line is available for the collection of
Smithfield's wastewater."" °
There was no certain date by which
Smithfield was required to comply with the state's Consent Special Order,
since the order created an open-ended requirement. 0 ' If the hook up had
FalteredAfterFine,THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, at D1 (Sept. 2, 1997).
...
See supra notes 298-308, 328-329 and accompanying text.
496 See Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of Richard Burton), supra note 482, at
491:13.
497 See CH2M HILL STUDY, supra note 263, at 6-1.
498 See 1994 Special Order Amendment, supra note 374, at 1.
499 In uncontested testimony at trial, the United States' expert witness, Garry Edward
Stigall, testified that wastewater treatment sufficient to comply with the phosphorus limit
would have taken "a matter of months" instead of the several years it took to construct
the HRSD hook up. See Transcript of Proceedings (testimony of Garry Edward Stigall),
supra note 482, at 102:8.
" Consent Special Order, May 1991, supra note 328 and accompanying text.
...
See generally id.
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never become available, it would have been impossible to violate the
order. Instead, it would have been necessary for the State to renegotiate
the order with the company. As it turned out, Smithfield was allowed to
violate the water quality standards contained in its permit for
approximately four years, even though it had the technical and financial
ability to comply with those limits by the date specified in its permit." 2
Furthermore, compliance with the permit conditions was consistent with
the planned environmental benefits obtained through their hook up to
HRSD. °3 It was possible for Smithfield to pursue initial treatment and its
ultimate hook up. It did not do so because of cost.
Virginia relied on the nature of the ultimate environmental remedy
in its enforcement action against Smithfield, and there it ended." ° The
state's action did not focus on the environmental damage created by the
facility's discharges during the pendency of the Orders or the economic
benefit accrued by Smithfield as a consequence of those discharges. The
enforcement strategy followed by the state in the Smithfield case was an
inappropriate use of a compliance assistance-based enforcement scheme
because it allowed Smithfield to dictate compliance with its permit
requirements based on an analysis designed to further the economic
interests of the company, regardless of the effect on the environment or
other regulated entities. 05 This takes a fundamental premise of the CWA,
mandatory compliance with the law as a pre-condition of discharge, and
turns it on its head. Smithfield had five years between the time the state's
water quality standard for phosphorus was adopted and the compliance
date for phosphorus established in its permit. °6 This allowed the company
ample time to assess its compliance options and select an appropriate
course of action. The responsibility for compliance rested with the
company, but the enforcement strategy adopted by Virginia had the effect
of skewing this responsibility at least as much toward the government and
away from Smithfield. By implication, using a compliance assistancebased system of enforcement as the sole response to violations presumes
502

See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 784 (E.D. Va. 1997).

503

See id.

504See supra notes 301-364 and accompanying text.
515 See supra notes 303-308 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 237-242 and accompanying text (Virginia adopted its definition of
Nutrient Enriched Waters and its Nutrient Policy in May 1988). See also supra notes
290-292 and accompanying text. Smithfield's permit was modified to require
compliance with the new standard within three years of January 1990, almost a full five
years from the adoption of the State's water quality standard. See id.

452

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 23:381

that it is the government that fails when a facility violates the law because
it is the government who has not provided the proper incentive or
assistance to the regulated facility.
The state's administrative remedy, however, did eliminate
Smithfield's discharge to the Pagan River entirely, something which
probably would not have been achieved through traditional compliance
with the permit."0 7 Smithfield has argued, therefore, that the state's
remedy achieved a long-term environmental result superior to that which
could have been obtained with simple compliance with the permit. 0 8 This
argument, however, ignores the fact that Smithfield has not eliminated any
of its discharges. Instead, they have simply diverted that discharge to
HRSD, which, in turn, discharges to a separate tributary of the Chesapeake
Bay. The remedy exacted by the State obviated the need for a NPDES
permit for the facility, 9 but it did not reduce the amount of pollutants that
enter the Chesapeake Bay because the treatment by HRSD is not likely to
reduce the amount of pollutants being discharged to a greater degree than
could have been achieved by Smithfield with its own treatment system.
Even if this argument were true, however, it is still not appropriate to
allow the regulated entity the ability to flaunt legally imposed
requirements for economic reasons, particularly where both the short-term
and long-term environmental benefits could have been achieved. The
principle at risk in this situation is clear: "the observance of laws duly
enacted by Congress is not left to the discretion of a regulated entity, after
consultation with its accountant."5' 0 The fact that the State allowed this
situation to exist is exacerbated by the fact that the State at no time
indicated any intention of offsetting the economic advantage obtained by
507 The permit would not have eliminated the discharge, but merely reduce the amount of
pollution emitted.
...
Brief for Appellant at 36, United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769
(E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 97-2709).
5' Smithfield, however, is still subject to CWA requirements through the National
Pretreatment Program (NPP) implemented under sections 402 and 307 of the Act. See
CWA §§ 402(8), 307(d), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(8), 1317(d) (1994). The NPP regulates the
introduction of pollutants by industry into Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) to
prevent those pollutants from causing water quality impacts to the receiving stream of the
POTW. See id. Therefore, Smithfield is still subject to regulation, but instead of the
State being the primary administering agency for the regulatory program (as it was under
the NPDES program), Smithfield is now subject to regulation by a local governmental
agency. In this instance, that local agency is the Hampton Roads Sanitary District
(HRSD).
"' United States v. Dean Dairy, 929 F. Supp. 800, 808 (M.D. Penn. 1996).
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Smithfield from its illegal discharge by imposing a civil penalty. This was
the final, and perhaps most important, consideration of the appropriateness
of the state's enforcement action.
The use of penalties to address violations is an important
component of the Policy Framework, but the policy also recognizes the
discretion available to the administering agency in assessing penalties.5 '
The Policy Framework states that the "EPA generally will not consider
taking direct enforcement action solely for recovery of additionalpenalties
unless a state penalty is determined to be grossly deficient."5 ' The Policy
Framework provides general guidance to determine when a penalty is
grossly deficient."1 3 The EPA is directed to look at whether the penalty
"bears any reasonable relationship to the seriousness of the violation" 1 4 as
well as "the economic benefit gained by the violator." ' 5 In terms of the
Smithfield case, the state did not indicate any intention of bringing an
action to recover a civil penalty until it became aware of the EPA's referral
to the Department of Justice. 16 The state's Consent Special Orders did not
impose a penalty of any kind on Smithfield. 517 Therefore, the state's
administrative actions bore no reasonable relationship to either the
seriousness of the violations or the economic benefit gained by the
violator. In the case against Smithfield, the state adopted a "helpful
servant5 18 posture that sought to protect the economic interests of the
company in the face of competing public interests, e.g., environmental
protection.
Based on the above analysis, the EPA concluded that Virginia's
Consent Special Orders were inappropriate responses to the violations at
issue. 9 Determining whether an approved state has taken timely and
appropriate enforcement, however, is but the first level of analysis
required before initiating direct enforcement action in an approved
-,"See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note
96, at 23.
52
" Id. (emphasis added).
513 See id.
514 id.
515 id.
516

117

See Letter from W. Michael McCabe to Thomas C. Hopkins, supranote 85, at 1-3.
See generally Consent Special Order, March 1990, supra note 297; 1990 Special

Order Amendment, supra note 326; Consent Special Order, May 1991, supranote 328.
518 See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, supra
note 3, 195-97 (statement of Becky Norton Dunlop, Secretary of Natural Resources,
Commonwealth
of Virginia).
59
See Letter from W. Michael McCabe to Thomas C. Hopkins, supra note 85, at 1-3.
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NPDES state.52° Once the EPA has ascertained that a state's action is not
or will not be timely and appropriate, the Policy Framework requires a
further analysis before the agency should act on its own. 2' The EPA must
evaluate if its direct enforcement action will address any one of five
overriding factors: 1) instances of significant economic benefit gained by
the violator; 2) violations which cause significant degradation to a national
or regional environmental priority; 3) interstate issues, such as pollution
effects which transgress state boundaries; 4) repeat patterns of violations
or violators "where the state response is likely to prove ineffective given
the pattern of repeat violations and prior history of the State's success in
addressing past violations;5 12 and 5) cases where there is significant
public health damage.123 In reviewing these factors, direct federal
enforcement action was warranted to address at least the first four of the
described factors, each of which is elaborated on below.
2. Instances of Significant Economic Benefit Gained by the Violator
Smithfield Foods is a profit-making company. 24 As a result of the
violations of its permit requirements, Smithfield was able to enjoy even
greater profits than it would have been able to achieve if it had complied
with the law in a timely fashion. 2 This is the essence of the United
States' claim that Smithfield garnered an economic benefit from its
noncompliance and it is the foundation of the EPA's decision to seek civil
penalties. 26 The principal purpose of civil penalties, in this instance, was
to ensure that Smithfield did not realize a competitive advantage over
similar companies facing similar environmental regulation.527 But what
was the extent of Smithfield's economic benefit that made it necessary for
the United States to intervene?
Smithfield was permitted to gain an economic benefit from two
sources: delaying the expenditure of capital necessary for wastewater
treatment, or avoiding totally the costs associated with timely compliance
520

See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note

96, at 21.
121 See id. at 21-22.
52 2
Id.at 22.
5
See id.
524 See generally Parker, supranote 494.
525
United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 348-49 (E.D. Va. 1997).
526
See id.
527 See id.
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of the permit's effluent limits. 528 These concepts are mutually exclusive.
Either you delay the installation of treatment or you avoid its installation.
You cannot do both. In the delayed expenditure scenario, Smithfield was
able to put off the installation of certain capital equipment which would
have been necessary to comply on time with the permit effluent limits
(particularly for phosphorus).529 In the avoided cost scenario, Smithfield
was actually able to avoid completely the expenditure of certain funds
which would have been necessary to comply with the permit conditions in
a timely manner. 30 To understand these concepts better, it is useful to
apply them directly to the situation Smithfield faced in its decision of how
to comply with its permit requirements.
The first thing to keep in mind when trying to understand the
extent of Smithfield's economic benefit is the nature of the Smithfield
plant. It is, in fact, two plants that operate simultaneously and
continuously.53 ' Therefore, there are two separate outfalls from which
Smithfield discharged its wastes to the Pagan River.532 One plant is
referred to as Smithfield Packing, and the other plant is referred to as
Gwaltney. 533 The Smithfield Packing plant completed the installation of
wastewater treatment equipment in 1996 (in anticipation of pretreatment
requirements for their discharge into the HRSD), three years after the
compliance date for phosphorus in their permit.5 34 This constituted a
delayed cost scenario since they did install the necessary equipment, but it
was installed three years later than it should have been installed.13' By
Smithfield's own estimate, the total on-time capital cost for the equipment
installed at Smithfield Packing was $2,121,449536
This capital
expenditure, however, was not the entire extent of the costs associated
with compliance at Smithfield Packing. In addition to these delayed
capital costs, there were also the avoided costs of operating and
maintaining (0 & M) the facilities in the intervening three years. 537 These
See Transcript of Proceedings (testimony of Robert Harris), supra note 482, at 364:1.
See id. at 3 64:6.
530
See id.
131 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp.769, 772-73 (E.D.
Va. 1997).
532
See id.
533 See id.
531 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774, 778.
528

529

535 See

Id. See also supra notes 528-530 and accompanying text.

536 See Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of J. Willis Sneed), supra note 482, at

438:9.
131

See Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of Robert Harris), supranote 482, at 377:1.
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three years of 0 & M costs constituted avoided costs for Smithfield. The
company's estimate of the 0 & M costs at the Smithfield Packing plant is
38
$49,000 per year.1
The Gwaltney plant, unlike the Smithfield Packing plant, had not
installed any of the necessary wastewater treatment facilities to comply
with its permit limits for phosphorus.53 9 Therefore, from the Gwaltney
side, Smithfield avoided completely the capital expenditure necessary to
comply with its permit. The total on-time capital cost of the facilities
necessary for compliance at Gwaltney were estimated by the company to
be $2,443,299.540 The irony of the Gwaltney plant is that there are no 0 &
M costs associated with compliance. The reason for this is that the costs
associated with 0 & M are more than offset by the expected profits
Smithfield could have achieved from recovering the solids of their
manufacturing process and selling these solids on the open market.5 4 ' The
profits Smithfield could have generated from their wastewater treatment at
the Gwaltney plant was estimated by the company to be $278,000 per
2
year.

54

This analysis, however, doesn't give us the information we need to
evaluate Smithfield's economic benefit of noncompliance. Clearly, the
sums of money being discussed are substantial, but it is not possible to
compare directly cash flows that occur in different years, e.g., it is not
possible to compare directly the relationship between the $2,443,299
Smithfield should have spent in 1993 with the money they actually spent
in 1996 at the Smithfield Packing plant. 43 The economic maxim at work
in this analysis is, "'a dollar today is worth more than a dollar a year from
now,' because today's dollar can be invested immediately to eam a return
over the coming year." 5 " Therefore, the earlier a cost is incurred, the
greater the impact of that cost on the entity spending the money. 45 We
need to account for this "time value of money" by converting all estimated
...See Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of J. Willis Sneed), supra note 482, at
438:22.
5"See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 348 (E.D. Va. 1997).
54 See Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of J. Willis Sneed), supra note 482, at
443:24.
5"See Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of Robert Harris), supra note 482, at 378:7.
542 See Transcript of Proceedings (Testimony of J. Willis Sneed), supra note 482, at
449:12.
543
See NONCOMPLIANCE-USERS MANUAL, supra note 149, at 1-6.
5
44 Id.
545See id.

1999]

SMITHFIELD FOODS: A CASE FOR FEDERAL ACTION

457

future cash flows to their "present value."5'46 This commonly used
economic technique is called discounting. 47 To determine the economic
benefit from the delayed and avoided cost scenarios presented above, it is
necessary to compare the present value of the cash flows associated with
on-time compliance with the present value of the cash flows associated
with delayed compliance, including the costs of replacing pollution
control equipment at the end of its useful life.54 The difference between
these two present values is the economic benefit of noncompliance.54 9 In
the case of Smithfield Foods, the court found this economic benefit to be
approximately $4,200,000. ss '
This sum constituted "significant economic benefit gained by the
violator" and formed a substantial basis of the EPA's decision to initiate
" ' Forcing Smithfield to pay a civil
direct enforcement action in this case.55
penalty in at least the amount of the economic benefit of noncompliance
eliminated any economic incentive for Smithfield to violate the law.
Furthermore, imposing such a penalty protected other companies who had
complied with the law in a timely fashion from being placed at a
competitive disadvantage by those who violate the law.
3. Violations Which Cause Significant Degradation to a National or
RegionalEnvironmentalPriority
The 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement begins as follows: "[t]he

Chesapeake Bay is a national treasure and a resource of worldwide
significance." '52 By signing this Agreement, the U.S. EPA, as well as
Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia, accepted
this declaration recognizing the bay's critical importance to the ecological
and economic health of the nation. 53 Further, the signatories committed to
"managing the Chesapeake Bay as an integrated ecosystem" and pledged

546 id.

547 See
54'

549

550

id.

See id at 1-5 to 1-6.
See id.
See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 773, 796 (E.D. Va.

1997).
551 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS,

21.
552

CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supranote 245, at 1.

...
See generally id.

supra note 97, at
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their "best efforts to achieve the goals in this Agreement." '
As an
articulated national environmental priority, the Chesapeake Bay and its
tributaries fall squarely within the Policy Framework's environmental
factor for the EPA to consider when deciding whether to initiate a direct
enforcement action in an approved state."'
Violations of permit
conditions which cause or contribute to the significant degradation of the
Chesapeake Bay, therefore, may be considered significant from a national
perspective. 56 If the EPA determines that the violations have created such
an environmental effect, then there is a presumption in favor of direct
action."5 7 In the case of Smithfield Foods, the EPA determined that
Smithfield's violations of its permit limits were responsible for the
significant degradation of a nationally important environmental and
economic resource.5 8
The Smithfield outfalls were the largest source of nitrogen and
phosphorus to the Pagan River prior to their diversion to the HIRSD. s5 9
From 1993 through 1995, the combined effluent discharges from
Smithfield accounted for between 128 to 233 thousand pounds of
phosphorus per year and between 422 to 852 thousand pounds per year of
nitrogen into the Pagan River estuary."6 ' What is striking about these
numbers is that during those same years, an average of 160,000 pounds of
the loading of phosphorus to the Pagan River was the direct result of
Smithfield's permit violations alone.5 6' The loading of nitrogen from
Smithfield's permit exceedences amounted to approximately 13,000
pounds per year.162 Between 1993 and 1997, Smithfield experienced
continuous noncompliance of its permit limitation for phosphorus and
significant violations of its permit limits for ammonia, TKN, fecal
coliform, cyanide, pH, TSS, and oil and grease. 63 During this time period,
554

Id.

5 See id. at 1; POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS,

supra note 96, at 21-3.
556

See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note

96, at 21-23.
557See id.
558
See id.
551See Dr. Jeffrey B. Frithsen, An Assessment of Environmental Impacts in the Pagan
River Estuary Resulting From Smithfield Food, Inc. 6 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished
report
on file with the author).
5
1 See id.
561 See id. at 8.
562
See id. at 8.
563 See supra Table IV-1.
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Smithfield contributed a cumulative loading of pollutants to the Pagan
River as outlined in Table IV-2.56
TABLE IV-2

Summary of Pollutant Loadings to the Pagan River by
Smithfield Foods
Pollutant Parameter

Loading (in lbs)

Total Phosphorus

691,000

Total Nitrogen

2,739,000

Total Suspended Solids

570,000

Oil and Grease

66,000

The discharge of these nutrients is the driving force behind
eutrophication-the overstimulation of primary productivity in an aquatic
ecosystem; and eutrophication is directly related to such water quality
impacts as increasing turbidity, undesirable algal blooms, and decreasing
levels of dissolved oxygen. 6 These water quality impacts have wideranging effects on the aquatic ecosystem. 6 a They can alter the species
composition of an aquatic ecosystem by triggering the displacement of
desired aquatic species, such as submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) and
the species which depend on SAV for habitat and food.167 In addition, low
dissolved oxygen conditions, which exist over large portions of the
Chesapeake Bay, can "eradicate benthic communities ' 68 making the
waters uninhabitable for desirable fish species, such as striped bass. 69
'64

The values in the table are derived from the expert report of Dr. Jeffrey Frithsen. See

Frithsen,
supra note 559.
565
See id. at 8.
566 See Dr. William A. Richkus, An Evaluation of Consequences to Living Resources of
Smithfield (Smithfield Food, Inc., Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., and Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd.) Discharge Violations, 7 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished report on file with
the
567 author).

See id.

568id.

569

See id.
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The presence of SAV provides vegetative cover for fish species,
especially in their juvenile stages, enabling such species to avoid predation
at critical early ages.5 70 The Chesapeake Bay Program has set certain
target goals for water quality to promote the re-establishment of SAV in
the Bay."7 ' Those goals are 0.01 mg/i of phosphorus for mesohaline
(moderately salty) waters and 0.02 mg/l of phosphorus for tidal fresh and
oligohaline (less salty) waters. 72 The Pagan River exceeds these water
quality criteria for the restoration of SAV. 73 It is not surprising then that
"the mainstream of the Pagan River is absent of SA." 74 The effect of
this is to limit the ability of the aquatic ecosystem to support viable
57
communities of "fish, crabs, waterfowl and other aquatic organisms.""
The existence of impaired waters in the Chesapeake Bay prompted
the Chesapeake Bay Commission to conclude that "[tihe improvement and
maintenance of water quality are the single most critical elements in the
overall restoration and protection of the Chesapeake Bay. 5' 76 The CBA
recognizes that the reduction of nutrients is essential to meet its overall
environmental objectives. 77 Therefore, the Agreement established the
goal of achieving, by the year 2000, a forty percent reduction of nutrients
entering the main stem of the Bay. 78 Given the loadings from the
Smithfield plants, if the company had simply complied with their effluent
limit for phosphorus in 1993 (as required by their permit), it would have
been "equivalent to about eleven percent of Virginia's total James River
point source phosphorus reduction goal. 5 79
Clearly, Smithfield's
discharges, particularly its discharge of nutrients, severely impacted the
Pagan River and contributed to the degradation of the Chesapeake Bay.
For this reason, among others, the EPA concluded that its intervention in
this case was warranted.

570

See id.
' See Frithsen, supra note 559, at 11.
572 See id.
573 See id.
5' Richkus, supra note 566, at 3.
575
id. at 7.
576 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 245, at 4.
577
See id.
178 See id. at 5-6.
571 Richkus, supra note 566, at 9 (emphasis in original).
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4. InterstateIssues-PollutionEffects Which TransgressState Boundaries
The federal government is uniquely positioned to address pollution
effects between proximate states. The Chesapeake Bay is a resource
shared by three states and the District of Columbia, and its estuarine and
tidal characteristics create conditions which distribute pollutants
throughout its entire extent. 80 Therefore, even pollutant discharges
created near the mouth of the Bay, such as those created by Smithfield
prior to its diversion to the HRSD, can be carried by tidal forces
"upstream" into the jurisdictions of Maryland, the District of Columbia
and even Pennsylvania. Such pollution imposes external costs on these
jurisdictions without any meaningful way for them to participate in the
"'
decisions related to the discharge of such pollutants.58
The Policy
Framework recognizes this as a possibility and provides the ability of the
EPA to intervene with direct enforcement action when violations of permit
conditions create pollution externalities in jurisdictions unable to
participate directly in the decisions related to the pollutant discharge. 8
Doing so discourages states from furthering economic or other state
interests by using lax enforcement against facilities that create real or
potential harm to people in nearby states.
In the case of Smithfield, the company's considerable discharges of
nutrients, as well as other conventional and toxic pollutants, entered the
Chesapeake Bay through the James River. 83 From there, they could be
dispersed to virtually any point within the Bay's system. 84 The pervasive
ecological effects of eutrophication caused by the overabundance of
nutrients was a persuasive consideration with respect to Smithfield. 85 The
0 See Chesapeake Bay Agreement, supra note 245, at 1.
One way adjoining states can participate in the NPDES permit issuance decisionmaking process is through the section 401 certification process outlined in the CWA. See
CWA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. But in the case of Smithfield Foods, it wasn't the permit
conditions which were at issue, it was noncompliance with duly enacted permit
conditions. Therefore, like the EPA, adjoining jurisdictions probably would not have
objected to Smithfield's permit conditions under the 401 certification process because the
permit imposed the appropriate limitations for phosphorus and other pollutant parameters
as developed by Virginia under their state water quality standards.
582 See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note
96, at 21-24.
583 The Pagan River discharges to the James River which in turn discharges to the
Chesapeake Bay.
584 See CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 245, at 1.
585
See supra note 582-583 and accompanying text.
58
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fact that the effects of eutrophication could be shared by other states, and
in particular Maryland, created a condition ripe for federal action because
Maryland otherwise would have limited recourse to address Smithfield's
permit exceedances directly, yet could suffer the deleterious consequences
of Smithfield's violations. 86 Our federal system was designed specifically
to arbitrate such conflicts between states without the need for direct
conflict between the individual jurisdictions. 87 The EPA, as the ultimate
arbiter of the CWA's regulatory programs, was particularly well placed to
act against Smithfield in this instance due to the potential for harm created
by Smithfield's discharges in political jurisdictions with little ability to
affect Smithfield's behavior.
5. Repeat Patterns of Violations or Violators
Smithfield is not new to the arena of CWA enforcement. The
company has a history of violations of the CWA which have been the
subject of extensive judicial proceedings. 88 Smithfield Foods, Inc.
acquired the Gwaltney plant from the ITT Continental Baking Co., and
they assumed the responsibility for the wastewater discharges from the
facility under ITT's existing NPDES permit as of October 27, 1981.89
The violations at issue in the complex course of litigation which followed
occurred between October 27, 1981 and May 15, 1984.590 During this time
frame, Gwaltney reported more than 150 violations of its NPDES permit59"'
for the following pollutant parameters: fecal coliform, chlorine, total
suspended solids (TSS), total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), and oil and
586 See id.
587 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
588 See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney

of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542

(E.D. Va. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791
F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct. 376, 98 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1987); Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988); Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 1988);
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir.
1989).
89See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304,
306 (4th Cir. 1986).
.90
See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1544 (E.D. Va. 1985)
9' See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690,

692 (4th Cir. 1989).
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grease.5 92 The violations themselves were never at issue during the rounds
of litigation. The issues at law in this case related to standing, subject
matter jurisdiction, and the maximum penalty liability faced by the
company for its violations. 93 Every pollutant parameter alleged to be in
violation during this litigation was also the subject of the United States'
current action against the company, with the notable exception of
phosphorus, which did not become an issue for Smithfield until the State
adopted its water quality standards in 1988 because no limit for
phosphorus existed prior to 1988.' 9'
In addition to the violations which occurred during the early 1980s,
the United States' case against Smithfield Foods was prompted by the
need to address the long history of permit violations by the company
which occurred subsequent to the litigation history outlined above. 95 The
current violations experienced by the company constitute repeat violations
of the Act and place the company in the position of knowing the CWA's
requirements but operating its plants in violation of those requirements.
The repeat nature of the violations at issue in the United States' action
exposed the company to greater scrutiny under the Policy Framework, and
created an additional factor for the EPA to consider in determining the
appropriate course of action against the facility. 96
The discussion thus far has focused on the factors for initiating
enforcement action in approved states established in the EPA's Policy
Framework. This analysis, however, does not tell the entire story. The
Smithfield case was of critical importance because it went well beyond the
traditional scope of the factors outlined in the EPA's Policy. It is to this
expanded analysis that I now turn.
V. BROADER POLICY CONCERNS-PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Beyond the policy concerns addressed by the EPA's Policy
"2 See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1544 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1985).
"' See generally Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F.
Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1989); Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985).
194 See supra notes 237-240, 265 and accompanying text.
'95 See Summary of Exceedences of Discharge Limitations, supra note 413.
596 See POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note
97, at 21.
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Framework, the Smithfield case was important because of the effect which
the state's Consent Special Orders had on public participation. The
Consent Special Orders utilized by Virginia in the Smithfield case were
"cooperative" enforcement measures negotiated between the state and the
company to address prospective permit violations, i.e., violations of the
permit which had not yet happened but would happen in the future.59 7
Importantly, at the time the Orders were negotiated and issued, there was
no requirement under Virginia law for a public hearing if the violator
consented to the issuance of the Order. 59 8 In each of the Orders issued by
the State to Smithfield, the company consented to the Orders, and
therefore, there was no requirement for a hearing and no opportunity for
the public to request a hearing. 99 Furthermore, under state law, the public
had no ability to challenge the conditions of the Order in court."'
In contrast, a modification to the conditions contained in a stateissued federal permit requires substantial public notice and EPA review
and comment.6"' These procedural requirements for permit modification
are not mere technicalities; they preserve the EPA's oversight role and the
public's right to participate in the pollution control process. 61" Both of
these goals are central to the CWA's overall scheme.6 3 In similar
contrast, Congress' stated policy for public participation in the protection
of the nation's waters led to prominent public participation requirements
in many aspects of the EPA's enforcement program. 6" For example, the
EPA's administrative penalty authority requires the EPA to give the public
notice of and an opportunity to comment on a proposed administrative
penalty assessment.60 ' The public is also guaranteed an opportunity to
request a hearing, to participate in a hearing, and to appeal an
administrative penalty assessment in federal District Court.60 6 From
Virginia's enforcement perspective, the Consent Special Orders

...See generally Consent Special Order, March 1990, supra note 297; 1990 Special
Order Amendment, supra note 326; Consent Special Order, May 1991, supra note 328.
5'8 See Statement of Undisputed Facts and Memorandum of Law, supra note 294, at 25.
'9
See id. at 25-26.
6
o0 See id at 26.
602 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
112 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 424, at 19-20.
603 See id. at 20.
604 See CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1994); CWA §§ 309(g)(4), 309(g)(8), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(4), 1319(g)(8).
605 See CWA §§ 309(g)(4), 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(4), 1319(g)(8).
606 See id.
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superseded the terms and conditions of the federal permit. °7 This created
the anomalous situation of a facility being simultaneously in compliance
(with the State Order) for state enforcement purposes, and out of
compliance (with the state-issued federal permit) for federal enforcement
purposes.60 8 This situation should have been addressed by the simple
process of following the appropriate public procedures to modify the
permit to incorporate the terms of the Consent Special Order.60 9 If
Smithfield had followed these procedures, it would have obtained a
definitive answer that would have bound the EPA and the public. 6 ' To do
so, however, would have given the public a say in the matter and the EPA
veto power over whether to eliminate the phosphorus limitation.6 ' Thus,
Smithfield may not have received the answer it wanted.
The above discussion has answered the primary policy question of
this case: why did the EPA choose to intervene with its own action? But
the article has only hinted at the answer to the second policy question
presented at the outset; i.e., why couldn't Smithfield simply have relied on
the state's administrative orders to determine its appropriate course of
action? A corollary question to this is: why did the state resist, and nearly
obstruct, the appropriate and intended role of the federal government in
enforcing the CWA? What should be clear from the above discussion is
that "[t]he holder of a state NPDES permit is subject to both federal and
state enforcement action for failure to comply" with the conditions of its
permit, even when those conditions are imposed solely pursuant to state
law (such as water quality standards).6 - Therefore, in the Smithfield case,
even though the phosphorus standard was developed pursuant to state law,
it was enforceable by the federal government because it was placed in the
company's NPDES permit. Furthermore, Smithfield did not attempt to
have that permit modified to relieve itself of its duty to comply with the
phosphorus standard." 3 Therefore, from a purely legal standpoint,
See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 776 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(citing a letter from the Virginia State Water Control Board to Smithfield Foods dated
607

October 10, 1991).
608 See id. at 783-85.
609 See id. at 783 n. 19 (stating Smithfield "should have sought a Permit modification, and
approval of the EPA, once it was clear they could not meet the deadlines in the Permit").
610
611

See 40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (1997).

See id.

6'2 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52-53

(1987).
613 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 787.
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Smithfield was subject to enforcement from both the state and the federal
government by virtue of its permit conditions, which is one reason the
company could not simply rely on the state's directions under the Consent
Special Orders.614
This answer, while compelling from a legal standpoint, fails to
address a significant policy argument for the importance of federal action
in this case. That policy argument relates to the federal nature of the
CWA's requirements and the federalist structure of our governmental
system. Ultimately, the policy argument for why Smithfield could not
simply rely on the state's direction relates to how our federalist structure
preserves individual rights and social welfare.
The importance of the Smithfield case transcends the policy
analysis taken up by this article thus far since it has implications well
beyond the EPA's policy for taking direct enforcement action in approved
NPDES states. The Smithfield case provides a unique opportunity to
examine the workings of the Constitution's federalist structure more than
200 years after the Framers put the basic system in place. In particular,
this case allows us to see how federalism continues to play a vital role in a
world where the compass of state sovereignty appears to have dwindled
with respect to the federal government and where national and
international markets have developed in ways that could not have been
imagined at the time of the Constitutional Convention. 65" The fact that
federalism continues to protect individual liberty and social welfare in a
world which is startlingly different from its ancestral environment is a
testament to the brilliance of the Constitution's design.
VI.

FEDERALISM AND THE SMITHFIELD CASE

Federalism is "perhaps our oldest question of constitutional
The question continues to arise because, like the Constitution
law.,
itself, the concept of federalism is continually adapting to the evolving
social, economic, and political conditions in this country. There is no
objectively "correct" position to take with respect to the relative and
proper division of authority between the federal government and the states.
Certainly, no single answer has satisfied the constituent elements of our
616

614
615

See id. at 787-88, 788 n.24.
See generally Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. 769. See also New York v. United States, 505

U.S. 144, 157-59 (1992).
616 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
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government over the course of our history.617 Given this reality, are we
simply cast adrift with no meaningful foundation upon which to proceed?
Absolutely not. What principles can we use, then, if not the actual
language of the Constitution (which provides little guidance to resolve this
issue)?61 There are two fundamental precepts which should inform our
debate about federalism. First, we should focus on the authority granted to
government, state or federal, by the true sovereigns, "We the People of the
United States ....
619 Second, we should consider the purpose for which
the people delegate authority to government, i.e., what is it that the people
want the government to accomplish?20 The first consideration is the
ultimate bedrock of our analysis because it does not change over time, but
the second precept, by necessity, is malleable and responds to the
changing perceptions of what constitutes the welfare of our citizens.
Because of this adaptability, we have a vital system of government which
can respond to changing needs instead of a moribund and anachronistic
polity bereft of relevance.
The Constitution cannot respond to or specify solutions to
problems which were unanticipated at the time of its framing. 61 This does
not mean that government should not address these issues or that
government is restricted to issues and perceptions that existed in 1789.
The genius of the Constitution is that its framework has been sufficiently
flexible over the past 200 years to allow the government to respond to
conditions which could not have been imagined at our country's outset.622
The federal government currently regulates activities which would have
been unimaginable to the Framers, but Congress has only pursued such
regulation because of an articulated social need. 623 The nature and
magnitude of interstate commerce and the range of commonly accepted
617
618

See id. at 159.
See James Huffman, Governing America 's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12

ENVTL. L. 863, at 870 (1981-1982) ("The document that was finally agreed upon offers
little express guidance to those who seek to define the relative powers of the state and

national governments.").
Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' rights:A
Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1762 (1995). See also U.S.

619

CONST. pmbl.
620

See Huffman, supra note 618, at 882. ("In the 1980's federalism should be viewed as

a62 mechanism for assuring that government does what we want it to do .... ").

'See id. at 866-67 ("The document of 1789 cannot specify solutions to problems

unanticipated at the time of its framing.").
622 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
62'

See id. at 157-58.
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objects of government regulation have indeed mushroomed in the last two
centuries, and the regulatory authority of Congress has grown
commensurately. 64 The economic conditions arising from the industrial
revolution and the expansion of interstate commerce have prompted
Congress to respond in a number of areas of social welfare impacted by
our economic apparatus, including: child labor, occupational health and
safety, and environmental protection.625 Using the Commerce Clause, the
Federal Government has extended both its reach and its willingness to
exercise power within the confines of the Constitution, but at the same
time, the apparent authority of the states has correspondingly diminished
as the federal government's expanding authority has encroached on areas
where states have had exclusive domain. 626 Therein lies the crux of the
debate.
Critics of the federal government's enforcement action in the
Smithfield case object to the federal government's expanded authority and
willingness to regulate in areas traditionally controlled by the states.62 7
Their fear is that "there is scarcely any human activity-with the possible
exception of daydreaming-that the central government does not attempt
to manage, to regulate, in a word, to control., 62' This expanded ability to
regulate is seen as "a usurpation of power" on the part of the federal
government which intrudes into the rights of the states to govern without
hindrance within their jurisdictions. 629
This perspective has been
expressed most clearly by Governor George Allen of the Commonwealth
of Virginia:
[Two centuries ago], the challenge to the liberties of
the people came from an arrogant, overbearing monarchy
across the sea. Today, that challenge comes from our own
federal government-a government that has defied, and that
See id.
See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(c) (1998); Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1999); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1857 et seq., 7401 et seq., 7601 et seq. (1995 & 1998 Supp.); Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1986 & 1998 Supp.).
626 See id.
627 See Dunlop Statement, supra note 113 ("Unfortunately, the federalism built into the
Constitution and spelled out so explicitly by the 10th amendment [sic] has been under
relentless attack for at least the last 60 years. Americans have grown accustomed to a
Big Nanny central government taking the lead, issuing orders, and doling out benefits.").
628 Id.
629 See id. at 5-6.
624
625
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now ignores, virtually every constitutional limit fashioned
by the Framers to confine its reach and thus to guard the
freedoms of the people.63
In making this claim, these critics highlight a prevalent view of our
federalist structure.63 '
The current debate in federalism has been cast almost exclusively
in terms of states' rights and the preemption of traditionally held state
prerogatives. 63' The original anti-Federalists opposed the newly developed
Constitution for fear that it granted too much power to the federal
government.6 33 The modem anti-Federalists have resurrected a version of
this argument cast in the form of states' rights and the prerogatives
preserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.634 In the states' rights
view, the federal government is seen as a "mistrusted agent of the
states, ' ' 635 with the role of the various states to protect their respective
citizens from the actions of the federal government. 636 States, according to
this perspective, are set against the federal government and seek to
preserve their perceived authority through nullifying "federal ... laws that
would otherwise frustrate state prerogatives. 637 In this view, the source of
political authority is the people of the various states (who represent the
"real" governments of the people), not "We the People of the United
States."63' 8 Modem anti-Federalists argue that "We the People" are
"engaged in a power grab, tilting the balance of power too far in favor of
the federal government. 6 39 This misses the point. This view takes an
unduly limited view of the federal government's role, and more
importantly, it creates an antagonism between the federal government and
the states that need not exist.
Framing the debate in this manner, as has been the trend in recent
630

Id.

631See
632

id. at 6.
See Huffman, supra note 618, at 866 ("To the extent that our discussions of federalism

focus on states' rights, as they invariably have throughout our history, we have lost the
perspective on the issue before us.").
633 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Balance of Power Between the Federal Government
and the States, in NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS 1 11 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1997).
634
See id. at 111-12.
635 Reynolds & Kates, supra note 619, at 1762.
636
See id.
637

id.

631

Id. See also Sullivan, supra note 633, at 112.

63

Sullivan, supra note 633, at 112.
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years, leads us astray by creating the presumption that the various levels of
government have inherent rights which can be usurped by its
competitor."4 This trend is unfortunate. Governmental power is not a
competitive zero sum game, where one level of government wins in a
power struggle to the exclusion of the other.64' The focus of the debate
should be on the purpose of government, which is to secure the liberties of
the people being governed and to provide for "the welfare of the
individuals whose lives are to a greater or lesser degree controlled by those
governments. ' ' 62 The proper way to evaluate any governmental action is
first to assess whether that action is consistent with the authority that the
people delegate or whether that action surpasses such authority and is
therefore ultra vires.6" Secondly, we should determine if the action does
what the people (not political or business leaders) want it to do. 6" To
speak in terms of states' rights, or federal rights, is to develop "theories
that justify the aggrandizement of power by one government or another,
rather than theories that justify government authority over individuals in
the interests of those individuals." 645
If there is one central truth which drove the Framers, it could be the
following: power is always the rival of power. 6
To manage this
tendency, the Framers constructed a government that would naturally
check the accumulation and exercise of unchecked power, i.e., power for

See Huffman, supra note 618, at 866 ("The very idea of states' rights (or federal
rights) has no place in debates over the structure of American government, unless one
believes that there are arguments to be made for government power for its own sake.").
See also id. at 884 ("To the extent that we perceive that the states and federal
governments have rights in relation to each other, history demonstrates that we will lose
sight of the more basic proposition that individuals have rights in relation to the
government, whether state or federal.").
641 See id. at 875-76 ("The dominant approach ... has focused on the state and national
governments as competitors for the exercise of a finite array of governmental powers.").
See also Sullivan, supra note 633 (The Constitution is "not a winner-take-all contest for
sovereignty between the federal government and the states.").
642 Huffman, supra note 618, at 867.
643 See Reynolds & Kates, supra note 619, at 1762.
640

"4 See Huffman, supra note 618,
645 Id. at 867-68.
646 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501

at 867.
U.S. 452, 459 (1991). "Power being almost always the

rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards
the general government." Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180 (Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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its own sake absent any public purpose or control. 7 In this regard, the
Federalist structure of state and federal sovereigns mimics and
complements the separation of powers between the various branches of the
federal government. Each structure (the federal structure of separate
branches and the federalist structure of state and federal sovereigns) is
designed to regulate the exercise of power to prevent abuse.6 48 It is crucial
to keep in mind that the federalist system is reciprocal in effect. 9 Not
only do the several states counteract the tendency of the central
government toward tyranny, the central government acts in like fashion
with respect to the states.65

Instead of characterizing federalism in terms of a competitive
usurpation of power, a different way to conceptualize the federalism
debate focuses on the intellectual argument in favor of federalism.65 ' This
argument identifies four distinct values which the federalist structure
provides to the ultimate sovereigns of this nation----"We the People of the
United States. 652 Those values include: 1) providing checks against the
concentration of irresponsible governmental power at either the state or
national level; 2) promoting republican values by allowing citizens the
opportunity to participate in public and political life; 3) providing for
political competition among jurisdictions, both vertically between the
national and state governments and horizontally among state and local
governments; and 4) promoting diverse social environments and
community cultures."' The current debate concerning federalism moves
away from these values and focuses on the relative powers to be exercised
by the respective governments, instead of the purpose for instituting those
64'See

id. at 458-59.

648 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("Just as the separation and

independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government... will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front.").
See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: A Converse-1983 in Context, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1248 (1994) ("federalism is indeed symmetric, and exists to protect
citizens' legal rights against governments").
649

650

See id.

65,See generally Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19
652 Id. at 917-18. See also Amar, supra note 649, at 1232

GA. L. REV. 917 (1985).
("Both sets of limited

sovereigns must be kept within the limitations imposed on their sovereignty by the
ultimate Sovereign-We the People of the United States who ordained and established

those limitations.").
See Stewart, supra note 651, at 917-18.

653
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governments.654
The "constitutionally mandated balance of power" between the
States and the Federal Government was designed to secure "our
fundamental liberties.,, 655 The issue, however, is not to decide an arbitrary
6

65
division of sovereignty between the federal government and the states,
but rather to discern the proper relationship between the people and
government (whether federal or state) and the proper role each respective
level of government should play in securing and providing for the basic
liberties and welfare of its citizens, no matter what state they inhabit. We
have a polity which secures our fundamental liberties, not because of the
allocation of jealously guarded enumerated powers between the levels of
government, but because of the existence of autonomous federal and state
political processes (not autonomous sovereignty) and the ability of the
judiciary to police congressional intrusion into those autonomous state
processes; i.e., the prohibition against "commandeering" state legislative
processes for federal purposes. 657 This autonomy of process between
political jurisdictions accomplishes two of the primary goals of federalism:
it diffuses effectively political power, and it provides for meaningful local
participation in our republican form of government. The diffusion of
power in our federal system ensures that no level of government exercises
unrestrained authority, and it guarantees the continued liberty of our
citizens.
The concept of social welfare, unlike our federalist structure,
however, has changed over time. What is striking in our system of
government is that our changing conception of social welfare can be
accommodated by appropriate governmental response without impacting
our government's stability. We have a stable polity because of the
separation of powers within the federal government and because of the
autonomy of state and federal political processes guaranteed by the Tenth

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
656 See 1997 Hearing Before the Committee on Environnent and Public Works, supra
note 2, 192-93 (statement by Becky Norton Dunlop, Secretary of Natural Resources,
Commonwealth of Virginia, March 5, 1996) ("The very essence of federalism consists in
reserving a certain degree of sovereignty for each of government's parts.").
657 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992). See generally H.
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993)
(discussing Justice O'Connor's approach to federalism in New York and her "autonomy
of process principle" and the role of the judiciary in policing congressional encroachment
on state autonomy).
654

65
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Amendment. For us to continue to have a relevant polity, however, it is
important that the government be able to respond to the needs of the
people as they change over time. If we carve out arbitrary areas of state
sovereignty which are immune from federal intrusion, then we may
forestall the ability of the government to address to its fullest possible
extent vital social and economic problems. It is critical that we be willing
to call on whatever level of government is best positioned to enhance or
further that conception of welfare.
This view of federalism is more appropriate than the traditionally
held states' rights view of government because: 1) it focuses on the
interests of the people of the United States, not on the interests of abstract
political entities; and 2) it avoids creating a situation of inherent conflict
between the federal and state governments, in which each is fighting to get
as great a share of power as possible in a zero sum game. Rather, the level
of government more appropriately positioned to act in given situation to
protect the public interest is the level of government that should act.
This is exactly what happened in 1972 with the landmark
legislation of the CWA.658 In this instance it was the federal government
that was called on to address an area of social welfare which had
previously resisted solution under state government control. 6 9 Prior to
federal regulation of water pollution, states allowed (or prohibited)
pollution as they saw fit. 660 The ability of state governments to prohibit or
restrict pollution discharges, however, was undermined by a fear that
businesses would move from any state attempting vigorous regulation.66'
Furthermore, to attract industry from neighboring jurisdictions, states
competed for this mobile capital by providing lenient pollution laws, or
lenient enforcement of those laws. 62 The consequence of this inaction
was clear: gross pollution abounded.66 3 Smog pervaded our cities, closings
of beaches and shellfish beds were well publicized and waterways caught

65'
659

Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 896 (1972).
See Robert V. Percival et al., Envionmnental Regulation: Law Science, and Policy

(1996), reprinted in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 217,
217-18
(Robert V. Percival and Dorothy C. Alevizatos eds., 1997).
66
See id. at 206-10.
661 See Stewart, supra note 651, at 919 ("The ability of state and local governments
effectively to regulate multistate businesses is undermined by . . . fear that corporate
investment may shift away from any state or locality attempting vigorous regulation.").
662
See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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fire. 6 The problem of pollution seemed overwhelming, and its impact on
aggregate social welfare was recognized for the first time. The public was
willing to accept, and indeed demanded, that the federal government
intervene.66 The message conveyed by Congress in 1972 (and which is
currently operative today) is that the control of water pollution using
national minimum standards is necessary to improve the social welfare of
citizens and to secure the right of each person to clean water.666
The Smithfield case illustrates the continuing influence exerted by
powerful economic constituencies on state governments and the effect
which that influence can have on environmental regulation. In this case,
the Commonwealth of Virginia appropriately imposed effluent limitations
based on water quality standards.66 7
These standards reflected a
commitment to improve the water quality in the Chesapeake Bay and to
further the environmental goals of the federal CWA.668
The
Commonwealth of Virginia made this commitment when it signed the
CBA and when it took over implementation of the federal NPDES permit
program.669 Once the standards were placed in Smithfield's NPDES
permit, however, the company threatened to leave the state to evade the
requirements. 67' As soon as this threat was made, the state entered into
cooperative consent orders negotiated with the company, with the state
using its prosecutorial discretion to address Smithfield's concerns in the
most economically advantageous way for the company. 67' Virginia's goal
was to prevent the company from leaving the state and taking the
economic base it had created to another jurisdiction.672 This action had the
effect of allowing Smithfield to continue its discharges into the Pagan
River without the benefit of the treatment necessary to comply with the

664

665

666

See id.
See Percival, supra note 659, at 206-2 10.
See Stewart, supra note 651, at 920 ("[F]ederal regulatory and social service programs

march under the banner of rights . . . . Federal regulatory and social programs are
justified politically as securing rights .... ).
667 See supra notes 237-242, 265-267 and accompanying text.
668
See supra notes 248-250, 241-242 and accompanying text.
66
See supra notes 230-236, 245-250 and accompanying text.
670
See supra notes 290-294 and accompanying text.
671 See supra notes 301-308, 325-332 and accompanying text.
672 See Andrew Cain, Beyer Attacks Smithfield Deal His Party Made; He Blames Gilmore
Citing Fine, THE WASHINGTON
3681338.

TIMES,

August 20, 1997, at C4, available in 1997 WL
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limits.673 In effect, Smithfield's influence with the state allowed it to
circumvent certain environmental "rights" espoused under the federal
CWA in favor of economic interests benefiting a small minority of people.
The Smithfield case is a classic example of the basic conundrum
faced by environmental public policy makers in the process of regulating
economic activity. The problem is how to reconcile the market's first
principle of "one-dollar/one-vote" within a political democracy whose first
rule is "one-person/one-vote. '6 74 The issue is to determine the proper
boundary of market principles, especially when those market principles
impinge on the democratic political principles of our governmental
system.67 5 The problem is one of factions, and whether powerful
economic factions can gain private political advantage by knocking on the
door of the government.67 6 The purpose of our federal system is not to
give such factions a second bite at the apple; its purpose is "to help limit
the responsiveness of government to particular factions at the expense of
others. 6 77 In the instant case, federalism served the basic public policy
function of upholding specified environmental "rights" of the people by
preventing the abuse of such rights by the state government under the
guise of prosecutorial discretion.
The federal government's enforcement action prevented one
powerful minority faction from using its considerable influence on the
state government to gain private advantage at the expense of the larger
public good. The issue in this case is not whether the federal government
(through "We the People") had the right to regulate the conduct in
question. The issue is when should the federal government, through its
considerable enforcement power, interject itself to serve the larger public
policy goals mandated by law. The Smithfield case is a good example of
when it is important for the federal government to act to restrain the ability
of states to accommodate economic interests (i.e., minority factions) at the
See generally Consent Special Order, March 1990, supra note 297; 1990 Special
Order Amendment, supra note 326; Consent Special Order, May 1991, supra note 328.
674 ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE 4 (1997).
675 See id. at 4, 328-29.
6716
See id. at 4, 345-46.
673

677 Huffman, supra note 618, at 881.

Madisonian factions will knock on the door of one government, and if
there is no answer, they will knock on the door of another government.
But the federal system does not exist to give factions a second chance,
it exists to help limit the responsiveness of government to particular
factions at the expense of others.
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expense of the environmental "rights" established for all people by law. In
the Smithfield case, our federal system, through the intervention of the
federal government, worked appropriately to limit the responsiveness of
the state government to a minority faction at the expense of securing the
basic right of the people of the region to clean water.
VII. CONCLUSION
The state's administrative actions in response to Smithfield's
violations were never intended to compel Smithfield to pay any civil
penalty for its violations, thus allowing the company to generate profits in
excess of what it could have achieved if it had complied with the law.678
Furthermore, the state's orders allowed Smithfield to continue violating
the water quality-based effluent limits in its permit for a period of
approximately four years (almost ten years after the initial promulgation of
the standards),679 creating significant environmental harm to the Pagan
River and, potentially, to the Chesapeake Bay, in contradiction to the
state's expressed commitment to further the environmental goals of the
Chesapeake Bay Agreement and the explicit commitment (through its
status as an approved NPDES jurisdiction) to further the environmental
goals of the federal CWA.680 Additionally, the violations of Smithfield's
permit created the potential for negative externalities to be imposed on
adjacent political jurisdictions, even though those jurisdictions were not
part of the decision-making process which allowed the violations to
occur.681 Beyond this, Smithfield's apparent lack of regard for the
requirements of the CWA, as evidenced by its familiarity with the Act's
requirements and its recalcitrant insistence on violating the Act for
economic reasons, formed a basis for the EPA to determine that direct
enforcement action by the federal government was warranted in this
case.682 Taken collectively, the factors presented above provided a strong
678 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 348-49 (E.D. Va.
1997).
67' See supra notes 237-240 and accompanying text (Virginia adopted its water quality
standards in May 1988); Brief for Appellants at 13, United States v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 97-2709) (Smithfield's HRSD Hookup for
the Gwaltney plant finally took place on June 24, 1996 and for the Smithfield plant on
August 4, 1997).
680 See supra notes 57-92, 237-268 and accompanying text.
681See supra notes 580-587 and accompanying text.
68
See supra notes 451-596 and accompanying text.
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incentive for the U.S. EPA to intervene in the state's administrative
enforcement action by requesting the Department of Justice to initiate a
civil judicial referral against the company.
Indeed, the federal
government's enforcement action in the Smithfield case was an example
of federalism working at its best to protect the public interest by
preventing the state from accommodating a powerful economic faction by
allowing it to impinge on the rights of the people without the ability of the
people of the state to challenge the state's conduct.

